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ABSTRACT

An Analysis of Institutions, Economic Freedom, and the Quality of Life
Nathan J. Ashby
The impact of economic freedom on the quality of life is the subject of interest for
this dissertation. Three separate studies are conducted. The first of these studies in
Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of economic freedom on the quality of life in an
international panel data study between 1985 and 2000. It is found that economic freedom
and in particular well-defined property rights and limited regulation lead to improvement
in the quality of life using the Index of Human Progress, an index made up income,
health and education indicators, and access to modern technology for individuals in a
given country. Chapter 3 contains the second study, a cross-sectional analysis of
migration of individuals between the ages of 20 and 59 in the United States between the
lower 48 states between 1995 and 2000. The impact of economic freedom on migration
as well as other control variables is measured and it is found that economic freedom has a
positive impact on the decision to migrate in aggregate. After decomposing the index
into the raw data, it is found that individuals move towards states with less restrictive
minimum wages, less restrictive tax rates for the top income group, less unionization, and
less dependence on public employment. It also found that individuals migrate towards
states with relatively higher expenditures by government. Chapter 4 contains the last of
three studies. This essay is an analysis of positive changes in economic freedom on
income and income growth for the lowest, middle, and highest quintiles of income in the
lower 48 states between 1980 and 2003. It is found that economic freedom has
significant impacts on income levels and growth rates for all three groups. However, the
results are the strongest for the lowest and middle quintiles. The share of income held by
the lowest quintile increases as a result of improvements in economic freedom whereas
the same change will lower the share of income held by the highest quintile. It is found
that inequality between the highest income quintile and the lowest quintile in the United
States is lowered by improvements in economic freedom.
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CHAPTER 1
ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE

“…the forces of the market are just that: They are forces;
they are like the wind and the tides…if you want to try to
ignore them, you ignore them at your peril…if you find a
way of ordering your life that is compatible with these
forces, indeed which harnesses these forces to the benefit
of your society, that's the way to go.”
—Arnold Harberger, 2000
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CHAPTER 1
ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE

1.1 Introduction
In the year 1215 A.D., the original Magna Carta was signed in England by King John
conceding rights to landowners by limiting expropriation of property by the monarchy to
the consent of Parliament. Although this individual act did not lead to immediately
accepted protections for individuals from government coercion—indeed there were many
versions of this document during the imminent centuries—it eventually led to the
Glorious Revolution in 1688 essentially providing the Parliament veto power over the
monarchy and instituting the Bill of Rights. Nearly a century later, on the American
continent an even bolder development occurred when the colonists signed the Declaration
of Independence demanding autonomy from the English crown. The U.S. Constitution
was signed in 1787, creating the first of many continuing republics in the current world.
The Industrial Revolution began in the early 19th Century resulting in an improvement in
production never even fathomed prior to that time.
All of these events were different points along hundreds of years of evolution of
institutional development. All were building upon their predecessors. Certainly, these
events are only discrete symbols of the continuous changes that were occurring through
voluntary institutional arrangements and individuals’ accumulation of knowledge that
were beneficial to society in fomenting the forces of production. Douglass North (1990,
1991) refers to this evolution as path dependence. Such changes are perhaps a function
of religious and cultural values and customs. The success of developed nations today can
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be traced through a path of successful decisions that were made throughout centuries of
historical precedents.
On the contrary, many less developed nations and the lack of quality of
institutions in these can be traced to a less effective pathway of institutional development.
Such is the case with many Spanish-colonized nations and the form in which Spain chose
to colonize (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). The methods used by the Spanish
were usually extractive and centralized instead of constructive and decentralized. The
evidence of the importance of institutions in development is becoming more widely
accepted by economists. What it is that leads nations towards development of quality
institutions is a puzzle that remains to be solved.

Some societies have gradually

improved their institutions throughout the centuries; others at some point have chosen
institutional pathways that have resulted in overall disastrous outcomes.
Milton Friedman (1962) suggests that the establishment of institutions of
economic freedom is a desirable objective for public policy in and of itself, but that it is
also a necessary means of obtaining political freedom and economic wellbeing. For
many, economic freedom is merely an ideal, simply an end; for some, it is a necessary
condition to ensure the perseverance of democracy and maximize the quality of life of
individuals. Even if one does not hold economic freedom as an ideal, there is much
evidence that it is desirable to promote such policies in order to achieve other outcomes
or economic objectives that would lead to improvements in the quality of life.
The purpose of this dissertation is to discuss and analyze empirically the extent to
which institutions of economic freedom enhance the quality of life. This opening chapter
will describe the meaning of economic freedom, provide a background on economic
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freedom as an ideal, present a description of economic freedom as an end to other
objectives, and give a summary of the three studies contained herein and the
contributions that they provide. Although the studies discussed are quite different, the
overall theme is consistent.

1.2 What is Economic Freedom
Milton and Rose Friedman explained in their book Free to Choose that “…an essential
part of economic freedom is freedom to choose how to use our income: how much to
spend on ourselves and on what items; how much to save and in what form; how much to
give away and to whom,”(1979). James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, authors of the
index called Economic Freedom of the World Index, state that important aspects of
economic freedom “…are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and
protection of person and property,”(2004). The Pacific Research Institute states that,
“Economic freedom is the right of individuals to pursue their interests through voluntary
exchange of private property under a rule of law, and this freedom forms the foundation
of all market economies,”(McQuillan, 2004). Numerous other definitions exist in the
literature.
Whatever the definition, it is commonly perceived that economic freedom
coincides with a competitive free market society which recognizes the right to personal
property and the ability to exploit it to one’s own advantage as long as such efforts do not
conflict with another individual’s equal rights. Numerous measurements of economic
freedom have been used to make up the different indices of economic freedom.
Measurements include government expenditures and ownership of enterprises, indicators
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of the tax rates and/or tax burdens, regulation of the market, freedom in labor markets,
the use of monetary policy and inflation volatility, freedom to trade with foreigners,
definition of property rights, and wage and price controls among many others. One
characteristic that all of these have in common is that each in some way goes hand in
hand with the principle of private property rights. In making this statement, it must be
made clear what is meant by private property rights. Certainly, property rights imply that
individuals are entitled to obtain tangible property through payment or transfer and have
legal ownership of all benefits that are created from the given property. In addition, it
implies that those holding such rights also bear the external costs imposed on other
individuals. This extends to the production activities and intellectual property rights as
well. However, individuals also have legal ownership of themselves and to receive
through voluntary arrangements remuneration for their labors and innovations.

1.3 Economic Freedom as an End
Regardless of the outcomes that result from institutions of economic freedom, it has been
argued that such institutions have intrinsic qualities that increase wellbeing. Amartya
Sen (1999) cites the example of African American slaves prior to the Civil War in the
United States as an example of this point. Although the remuneration of slaves has been
demonstrated to be very similar to their non-slave counterpart agricultural laborers, many
slaves did run away from their owners. In addition, efforts to employ the slaves in gang
labor after they were emancipated yielded no success despite the competitive wages that
were offered them. Certainly, the ability and freedom to use their own labor how they
saw fit was a tremendous improvement of their overall utility.
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One could explore the writings of philosophers from centuries past to establish the
exact birth of this ideal, but it is highly probable that the writings of John Locke (1690) in
the late Seventeenth Century had great influence on its acceptance. In his Second Treatise
on Government he stated, “Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all
men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but
himself.” Further, he claimed that the protection of property is the sole responsibility of
government, “…government has no other end, but the preservation of property,”(1690).
The U.S. Constitution contains various provisions that demonstrate the acceptance
of this institution by the framers. The latter part of the Fifth Amendment states that an
individual shall not be “…deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” This
amendment assures all individuals the right to protection of property through the legal
system, and that the government can not expropriate property without paying for it, a
legal concept known as eminent domain.

It demonstrates that the ideal of private

property rights—or at least compensation for property—was greater than any other
purpose that the government might have deemed necessary to carry out.

Thomas

Jefferson apparently considered this to be the case when he stated during his first
inaugural address that he believed in a “…frugal Government, which shall restrain men
from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits
of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has
earned.,”(Inaugural Addresses, 2001).
As mentioned above, various measurements of economic freedom have been
included in indices of economic freedom.

Again, in some way these indicators

7
demonstrate the extent to which government policy violates the principle of private
property rights.

The size of government and the level of taxation are commonly

considered in such measurements. The government must surely spend and tax at least in
order to maintain the basic institutions and legal structures to maintain and protect
property rights. However, taxes are not voluntary and are a claim on the property of
individuals.

A tax on land to some extent diminishes an individual’s right to that

property as well as a tax on labor violates that individual’s right to obtain the fruits of
his/her labors.
Regulation by the government of private industry and even government
ownership of industries violates the principle of property rights in many ways. Heavy
regulation inhibits or even prohibits firms from producing goods and services that will
increase their profits and the value of their property while restricting the scope of the use
of such goods. At the same time, they violate the consumer’s ability to benefit from the
availability of goods and services that would increase their quality of life had such goods
been available. Many government agencies have been formed in the United States and
around the world in the name of benefiting the consumer, but often fail to yield intended
objectives.

Regulation of the railroad, airline, and trucking industries usually have

resulted in higher prices for consumers and a higher concentration of unionization. The
Food and Drug Administration was formed to prevent “dangerous” drugs from being
introduced to the market by requiring extensive testing. However, many argue that the
result has been more to slow the introduction of drugs that could have saved lives or
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alleviated pain and suffering had they been introduced earlier.1 Recently, it has come to
the attention of the Wall Street Journal that Tenefovir, a drug that has been known to
prevent HIV since 1995, has been kept from the public for many years due to FDA
regulation (Hamilton and Chase, 2006). This would appear to support the allegations that
regulation is more motivated by politics than anything else. An alternative non-caloric
sweetener, Stevia, which is grown in Paraguay, has been argued by many to be a much
healthier alternative to domestic sugar (Das, Das, Murphy, Punwani, Nasution, and
Kinghorn, 1992; Yamada, Ohgaki, Noda, and Shimizu, 1985).

However, the sugar

lobby—as usually is the case—has been more effective in protecting its interests than the
health advocates. For years Stevia had been labeled as an illegal drug by the FDA solely
based on a controversial 1968 study which suggests that it reduces fertility in women
(Planas and Kuc, 1968). Due to the passage of the Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act, it can now legally be sold in the United States. But, only as a
“supplement”; not as a “sweetener.”
To the extent that individuals are allowed to offer their labor voluntarily in
exchange for an agreed upon wage, they are exercising their right to utilize property
rights for their own wellbeing. Policies that limit this ability such as minimum wage
laws, unionization, strict licensing requirements, or a high percentage of government
employment as a percentage of total employment reduce economic freedom and violate
the principle of private property rights.

1

Friedman explain the reason for this. The cost that the FDA bears if someone is killed by a dangerous
drug may be enormous. However, if many people die due to a drug not being available on the open market,
the cost borne by the agency is likely to be minimal.
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Government policies with respect to trade can greatly inhibit the ability to utilize
property to one’s benefit. Excessive tariffs and quotas may benefit individuals in those
protected agencies in the short run. Yet such policies curtail firms in foreign countries
from maximizing the gains from their property. Likewise, they indirectly create market
power in the hands of domestic industries. Thus, domestic consumers and producers
must pay higher prices for goods and services and have less selection to choose from.
Whenever monopoly is present, it reduces the ability of individuals to benefit from
voluntary exchange. Policies that promote such market power arbitrarily transfer the
value of property from some groups to others.
The government has the capability of determining the value of the currency in the
economy. By printing money at a high rate it increases the price level and reduces the
value of money and all assets denominated in that currency. All financial property
owned in that currency will diminish in purchasing power. In addition, volatility in the
rate of money growth makes it difficult to make informed decisions and arbitrarily
transfers property between lenders and borrowers. Thus, the use of inflationary and
volatile monetary policy is a violation of the principle of property rights and reduces
economic freedom.
Many other variables used in indices of economic freedom could be discussed
and a reasonable relationship between economic freedom and the principle of private
property rights would be found.
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1.4 Economic Freedom as a Means
Ideals aside, institutions of economic freedom are also a means in obtaining other
objectives such as political freedom or economic prosperity. Milton and Rose Friedman
wrote that economic freedom is necessary condition for political freedom and prosperity,
“…we know of no society that has ever achieved posterity and freedom unless voluntary
exchange has been its dominant principle of organization,”(1979).
On this subject, the Nobel Laureate and Austrian scholar Friedrich von Hayek
(1944) wrote in the Road to Serfdom,

“It is now often said that democracy will not tolerate
‘capitalism’. If ‘capitalism’ means here a competitive
system based on free disposal over private property, it is far
more important to realize that only within this system is
democracy possible. When it becomes dominated by a
collectivist creed, democracy will inevitably destroy itself.”

These arguments concur with the position that a democracy can not be
maintained unless individuals are free in relation to economic matters. The direction of
causality should generally go from economic freedom to political freedom. Milton and
Rose Friedman (1979) give anecdotal accounts demonstrating this fact. The institution of
property rights arguably instigated a movement towards political freedom that resulted in
the Revolutionary War and the creation of the United States of America. South Korea’s
transformation towards democracy was induced by capitalism that was put into place by a
dictator. On the other hand, Singapore continues to be a dictatorship today and political
freedom is minimal, but this has apparently not been a threat to the economic freedom of
its constituents. In general, there have been some attempts to demonstrate this direction
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of causality empirically, and these have been positive (Far, Lord, and Wolfenbarger,
1998). However, since this is a long-run phenomenon, it will take some time to answer
this question satisfactorily.
Simultaneous to the idealistic pronunciation of freedom on the American
continent was the publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Ideals aside, Smith
was attempting to demonstrate that free market institutions actually are beneficial to
society, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest,”(1776). In other words, in
a society that honors individual private property rights economic outcomes that are
beneficial to society in general will emerge.

Nations that voluntarily adopt such

institutions will generally be wealthier and more developed as a result of the incentives
provided to its residents.
Contemporary economists have carried out many empirical experiments to
discover whether this is in fact true. Do institutions of economic freedom increase
income and the rate at which an economy increases in productivity? The evidence
appears to be affirmative. Do these policies result in lower poverty rates, higher literacy
rates, and greater health of individuals? Studies seem to indicate that this also is the case.
The contributions of this dissertation are three studies that further analyze the effect that
economic freedom has on the quality of life. These studies will be discussed in more
detail in Chapters 2 through 4.
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1.5 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS
Chapter 2 is an analysis of panel data of 78 countries and the impact of economic
freedom on the Index of Human Progress or the IHP (Emes and Hahn, 2001). The IHP is
a measurement constructed by the Fraser Institute similar to the Human Development
Index or HDI (UNDP, 1995, 2001, 2003) that considers additional measurements of
quality of life beyond income, life expectancy, and health indicators; it also arguably a
better measures improvements through time.

In particular, the IHP includes the

attainment of technological goods such as televisions, radios, and telephone services by
country. It better measures progress through time by measuring the improvement of each
country using the base year of 1975.
The Economic Freedom of the World Index (Gwartney and Lawson, 2005)
constructed by the Fraser Institute is regressed on the IHP along with other institutional
measurements for the quality of government and the rule of law from the International
Country Risk Guide. The panel data includes data from the years 1985, 1990, 1995, and
2000. After controlling for possible geographic impediments to development such as
ethnic differences, tropical location, landlocked location, and degree of urbanization, it is
found that economic freedom significantly impacts quality of life using this
measurement.

Further regressions analyze the impact of the economic freedom

components on the quality of life. It is found that sound property rights and limited
regulation are significant determinants of quality of life. This study adds to the plethora
of evidence of the benefits of economic freedom in obtaining economic outcomes and is
one of few to analyze the different components of the index.
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Chapter 3 is an analysis of the impact of economic freedom on migration flows
between the lower 48 states. The index used for this analysis is the Economic Freedom
of North American Index (Karabegovic and McMahon, 2005) also constructed by the
Fraser Institute. Although the evidence of the benefit of economic freedom in income
levels and growth is significant, there are no published studies analyzing the impact of
economic freedom on the decision to migrate. This is perplexing given that the decision
to migrate is the result of individuals manifesting their preferences and such a study could
have interesting policy implications.

Many have suggested using migration as an

indicator of quality of life enhancement. Using a gravity model which accounts for
spatial effects it is determined that economic freedom indirectly impacts migration flows
for individuals between the ages of 20 and 59 through the channel of income and
employment growth. In addition, this study analyzes the raw data for eight of the ten
measurements to determine how individuals react in aggregate to different policies.
Interestingly, all economic freedoms do not have the same impact. Measures such as
higher government consumption and social security payments—which would tend to
reduce economic freedom according to the index used in this study—are significant in
attracting migrants. Consistent with the index as a whole, however, states with lower
marginal tax rates for the highest income group and high income thresholds for these
taxpayers, less restrictive minimum wage laws, a smaller percentage of employees in the
public sector as a percentage of total employment, and a lower degree of unionization are
all significant in attracting migrants as well. This study is based heavily on Ashby
(2007). This chapter will discuss these results and the implications with regards to fiscal
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federalism and the preservation of the market mechanism through economic
decentralization.
Chapter 4 is based on Ashby and Sobel (2006). This chapter analyzes how
economic freedom levels in 1980 and economic freedom changes since that time have
impacted individuals in different income groups by U.S. state. A handful of studies exist
that analyze the impact of economic freedom on equality measures such as the Gini
coefficient or the share of income held by the poorest income earners relative to the
wealthiest. In particular, Berggren (1999) analyzes the impact of economic freedom
changes between 1975 and 1985 and levels on some of these measures for a cross section
of countries. Scully (2002) finds that higher levels of economic freedom are significant
in improving income for all five income quintiles at the international level. The analysis
in Chapter 4 will conduct similar tests as well using the Economic Freedom of North
America Index to analyze the impact of economic freedom changes and levels between
1980-1982 to 2001-03 on measurements of income for different groups. It is found that
positive economic freedom changes positively impact income growth for the lowest and
middle income quintiles during this period. The same outcome is found for high income
earners. However, this finding is not as robust. Similarly, it is found that economic
freedom significantly impacts income levels for the lowest and middle income quintiles,
but the results are not as strong for the richest Americans.
The last set of regressions analyzes the impact of economic freedom changes and
levels on the share of total income held by the poorest individuals and find the
relationships to be positive and significant. These results provide interesting new insights
to the benefit of economic freedom. In particular, it appears that the poorest individuals
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tend to benefit greatly from policies that promote voluntary exchange. Most importantly,
it is found that inequality is reduced by positive changes in economic freedom.
Finally, Chapter 5 will summarize the results presented herein and provide
concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2

PROPERTY RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE:
AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL PANEL DATA

“Where you live should not decide whether you live or
whether you die.”
—Paul Hewson (AKA Bono), 2004
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CHAPTER 2

PROPERTY RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE:
AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL PANEL DATA

2.1 Introduction
The amount of literature on the effect of economic institutions—in particular, economic
freedom—on growth is significant. The evidence seems to strongly favor sound property
rights and its positive effect on economic growth. However, there has been criticism of
the use of growth in GDP per capita as a measurement of overall well being or quality of
life (Bauer, 2000; Sen, 1999). Such criticism has been rejoined by various studies that
have demonstrated that economic freedom positively influences other measurements of
life satisfaction such as human poverty measures, literacy, overall education, life
expectancy, and mortality rates (Norton, 2003; Esposto and Zaleski, 1999).
This analysis seeks to contribute to these studies in two ways. First, alternative
measurements of quality of life from the United Nations and the Fraser Institute will be
discussed. The Human Development Index (HDI) has been used by the United Nations
and is a weighted index measuring income, education, and health of 162 countries
(UNDP, 1995, 2001, 2003). This study will use the Index of Human Progress (IHP)
which includes additional indicators of wellbeing including the attainment of
technological goods (Emes and Hahn, 2001). It also is a better measurement of how
countries progress through time. Results of a similar study that analyzes the effect that
property rights have on quality of life using the Economic Freedom of the World Index
(Gwartney and Lawson, 2005) and data from the International Country Risk Guide
(Political Risk Services, 2004) will be compared to results obtained using the IHP.
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The Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFW) is made up of five
subcomponents measuring the size of government, property rights policy, monetary
policy, trade policy, and regulation (Gwartney and Lawson, 2005). The second
contribution will be to regress these components on the IHP to analyze the specific effect
that each of these components on quality of life. Decomposing the index has been
attempted in other studies dealing with economic growth (Ayal and Karras, 1998;
Carlsson and Lundstrom, 2002; Heckelman and Stroup, 2002), but this is the first attempt
to determine the effect that they have on other measurements of well being suggested
herein.
The format for the remainder of this paper will be as follows. The following
section will discuss the importance of quality institutions in development and arguments
dealing with property rights and other free-market policies and why they are important
for economic development. Next, the various data gathering sources will be described in
minor detail, and the measurements that will be used in this study will be discussed.
Section 2.4 will explain and interpret the theoretical model and the regressions for this
study.

The significance of these results will be analyzed.

Finally, the paper will

terminate with concluding remarks and important implications of the study.

2.2 The Importance of the Institutions in Determining the Quality of Life
Neoclassical models have prevailed in economic literature for decades. This is not
without good reason since such models appear to have been somewhat successful at
explaining economic outcomes in developed nations. Since developed nations generally
have better quality institutions, models that demonstrate that economic outcomes might
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be improved at the margin through greater capital accumulation and improvements in
technology have been useful.

Although some of the assumptions of neoclassical

economic theory may not hold in the extreme such as individuals always acting
rationally, the premise for individuals’ and firms’ maximizing behaviors, and
independent action of agents on all fully available information, the outcomes in
developed nations are relatively consistent with many neoclassical predictions.
However, such models which ignore the importance of quality institutions, have
not been as useful at explaining economic outcomes in the developing world.
Transaction costs are sometimes implicitly assumed to be zero or extremely low in
neoclassical theory. In reality transaction costs are always present and will be particularly
high where poor institutions provide incentives for individuals to spend their time in
costly activities that provide no benefit to society. Where the institutions of a given
nation fail to create the incentives and responses that are predicted by neoclassical
models by any proximity to its assumptions, neoclassical theory fails. In the presence of
significant transaction costs, a well-functioning institutional structure is the ever
important precursor to obtaining economic prosperity.
North (1990) defines institutions as the “framework in which human interaction
takes place.” He discusses the importance of informal and formal institutions (North,
1991). Successful institutions—be they economic or political—will provide an incentive
structure that leads to productive endeavors that enhance the welfare of individuals as
well as the society as a whole. Such institutions evolve through history and are not easily
passed on to developing nations. For instance, North demonstrates the path dependence
of British-colonized nations that allowed these to be successful and the evolution of

20
property rights that had occurred throughout the earlier centuries in the parent nation. On
the contrary, he argues that institutions for Spanish-colonized countries have not been
very effective and traces this to the inability of Spain to adopt effective institutions at that
time and during the years previous to colonization. Indeed, Spain lost the standing that it
had once held in the world in the imminent centuries to Britain.

Latin American

countries continue to lag behind British-colonized nations such as the United States,
Australia, New Zealand, and in later centuries, Hong Kong.2
Barro (1994) finds that institutions of democracy are important for countries at
lower levels of political freedom. However, it is found that after a moderate level of
political freedom is obtained, growth is depressed. This is due to the costs of rent seeking
and other costs from collectivization that allocate resources towards less productive
endeavors.
The extent to which institutions of property rights enhance wellbeing depends on
the dichotomy between “rule space” and “policy space” (Scully, 1997). The former is
determined by the extent to which property rights are defined through the construction of
constitutions, laws, or other legal structures. The policy space, therefore, considers the
actual course of action adopted by a government to uphold and facilitate the full benefits
of a well-defined structure of property rights. It is therefore argued that these two
separate but essential mechanisms must be in place in order for institutions to lead to
welfare-augmenting productive activities.

2

One might point out to the fact that many of the colonies that Britain settled have not done so well such as
India, the Gold Coast (Congo), and various African nations. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001,
2002) claim that Britain had two different colonizing strategies. One strategy is for long-term settlement
and the other is extraction. It is argued by these that the latter strategy has resulted in institutions that have
been perpetuated through time and this explains why these face much difficulty in developing their
economies.
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Epstein (1985) introduced a paradigm through which the welfare effects of
property rights can be tested. When measuring the effectiveness of the institution of
property rights, the measurement of success is the extent to which the social pie expands
as a result of such institutions. In other words, the initial distribution of the pie is not so
much a concern, but the extent to which property rights induce an increase in the quality
of life for all individuals.

This concept coincides with the Pareto principle that

institutions are successful if they result in making individuals better off without making
anyone worse off. In a stricter sense, the Pareto principle implies that everyone should
experience an improvement in their wellbeing. This conflicts with the view of those that
perceive property rights as a social ill which necessarily leads to exploitation of the poor
and wide gaps in social equality.3
Well-defined property rights enable individuals to gain from economic activities
and hence create incentives for productive endeavors. The existence of these institutions
is necessary for individuals to be willing to make contracts and carry them out. However,
in order for such institutions to be effective, the mere existence of such rights does not
suffice. Of necessity is the ability to enforce agreements and contracts. The ability to
obtain a right to property should be stripped of bureaucratic redundancy in order to
reduce the costs. The creation of property rights, if done improperly, will not result in
empowerment of individuals and may indeed lead to worse conditions for many of these.
North (1991) suggests that a secure property rights structure entails a judicial system that
permits lower costs of making contracts and flexible laws which allow various
organizational structures.
3

Although Berggren (1999) finds that increases in economic freedom and property rights coincided in
more equality between 1975 and 1985.
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De Soto (2000) describes many problems in developing functional institutions of
property rights. Entrepreneurs seeking to obtain financial capital are greatly curtailed by
the inability to collateralize legitimately recognized titles. This results in ‘dead capital’,
the inability to use assets to produce capital. It is estimated that 70 percent of credit
received by new businesses is obtained by using formal titles as collateral. The main
contribution made by De Soto is to point out that the mere legal existence of property
rights is not a sufficient condition for economic prosperity; institutions of property rights
must be packaged with few bureaucratic impediments.
The Economic Freedom of the World Index (Gwartney and Lawson, 2005) is
made up of five components which measure different institutions. These institutions are
the size of government, property rights and legal structure, money and inflation, trade
freedom, and regulation. These institutions should be placed mostly in the “policy
space”, although one could possibly argue that property rights might be included in the
rule space. These indices are made up of averages of various indicators. Although one of
the indicators seeks to measure property rights in a more direct form by analyzing
protection of intellectual property and impartiality of the courts, all of these are indirectly
related to the principle of property rights. As government consumption and government
ownership increases, the property right of individuals to receive the benefits of the use of
their property is transferred from the private sector to the government whether it be
through taxation or government ownership of enterprises. Unstable monetary policy
increases uncertainty on the part of property owners with regards to the value and
profitability of their assets. When the growth of the money supply is high and volatile, it
arbitrarily allocates gains from property between borrowers and lenders.
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Less restrictive trade policy benefits domestic consumers in that it allows them to
purchase the cheapest and/or best quality goods that are available. On the contrary, more
restrictive trade policies encourage inefficiency in production in that domestic producers
face little or no pressure from foreigners, pressure that would help foment specialization
of labor by domestic producers and development of better technology and products
domestically. Such policies might be high tariff rates on imported goods, import quotas
and other non-tariff barriers, exchange rate controls, and excessive controls over capital
markets. These restrictions are limitations on the private rights of producers to allocate
their resources towards economic gains that benefit them as well as their consumers.
Finally, regulation of entrepreneurial opportunities, credit markets, and labor
markets inhibit individuals from buying and selling privately-owned factors of production
at mutually beneficial quantities and prices.

Bauer (1946) demonstrated how regulation

of the Malayan rubber industry in the 1930s led to substantial underproduction adversely
affecting poor small holders. Regulation is usually justified in politics on the basis of
protecting the consumer from unfair pricing power and unsafe products. However, it has
been demonstrated that the very industries being regulated are quite often the ones that
stand to benefit the most.

Stigler (1971) discussed a theory of regulation and

demonstrated that efforts to regulate railways, trucking, medical, and various other
industries led to restrictions to entry and higher than normal wages. Government control
of prices and wages invariably results in costly misallocation of resources by inducing
persistent underproduction and underutilization of economic factors of production.
In addition to the rule space and policy space, there is one more type of institution
that should be included. The quality of government is a significant determinant of the
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effectiveness of the rules and policies that are put in place. When the formal and
informal institutions of government involve high levels of corruption and bureaucracy,
the ability of the rules and policies to result in effective outcomes might be diminished.
If the very individuals in charge of the rules and policies are not willing to enforce or
apply these to themselves, they will likely not result in an efficient institutional structure.
However, if institutions function properly opportunism by government officials will be
more limited due to the checks on government from quality political institutions.
Therefore, it would be expected that these would be highly correlated with good
institutions and policies.

Nevertheless, the estimates will control for these factors

separately.

2.3 The Data
2.3.1 Measurements of Quality of Life
Numerous measurements have been used to gauge the economic effects that result from
well-defined property rights. There are at least twenty nine attempts to assess the effect
that property rights and economic freedom have on economic growth or per capita
income across nations. Most of these studies have demonstrated the relationship to be
positive. However, the use of income as a measurement of quality of life has been
criticized.

Bauer (2000) demonstrates the perversity in the implication that can be

derived when income per head is used as an indicator of the quality of life given by the
fact that the birth of a calf will increase national income per head whereas the birth of a
human will reduce it. In addition, Sen (1999) explains that there is certainly an increase
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in wellbeing due to the longevity of life, and thus quality of life can not merely be
measured by the accumulation of wealth and income.
There have been some efforts to remedy this fissure in the literature. Norton
(1998; 2003) uses the standard measurements of well being used by the United Nations
(UNDP, 1999, 2001, 2003), the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Human
Poverty Index (HPI). Both the HPI and the HDI range between zero and one hundred. A
high HPI value represents a low quality of life whereas a high HDI value represents a
high quality of life. The HDI consists of three components: health, education, and
income per capita.

The subcomponents of these indices measure life expectancy,

education, literacy, probability of living to age 40, access to safe water and health
services, adult literacy, and the portion of children that are underweight have also been
used as dependent variables (Norton, 2003; Esposto and Zaleski, 1999). For the most
part, the relationship between the measurements of well being and property rights has
been positive and significant. However, due to the limited availability of sample periods,
the direction of causality remains to be seen.4
The Index of Human Progress (IHP) developed by the Fraser Institute is an
alternative to the HDI (Emes and Hahn, 2001). It consists of four main components also:
health, technology, education, and income. One problem that may result from use of this
measurement is the fact that six additional indicators in calculating these sub indices are
required thus reducing the sample size. In all there are 162 countries for which the HDI

4

Far, Lord, and Wolfenbarger (1998) obtained positive results demonstrating that economic freedom
causes economic growth. However, due to the short amount of periods available it is difficult to consider
the results as conclusive
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is calculated and 128 for the IHP. The index is calculated for 1985, 1990, 1995, and
1999. Since the year 2000 will be needed for this analysis, the 2000 IHP is imputed by
measuring the rate of change between 1995 and 1999. In the year 2000, Luxembourg,
Switzerland, and the United States have the highest IHP values, whereas Niger, Mali, and
Cyprus have the lowest IHP values. In the year 1985 Niger, Mali, and Senegal had the
lowest IHP values, and Switzerland, the United States, and Japan had the highest values.
The appendix includes a more specific explanation as to how the two different indices are
calculated for comparison’s sake.
There is a positive correlation between well-defined institutions of property rights
and the extent to which individuals in a nation are able to obtain the basic needs of life.
This relationship would seem to fail to reject the implications suggested by Epstein that
private property rights tend to expand the social pie. An interesting question to pose
would be to what extent these countries benefit from the adoption of advanced
technologies that might enhance the quality of life through enhancing leisure. Consider a
continuum of goods from x1 to xz. Let x1 represents the most essential good for survival.
This good might be clean water. Let xz represent the good that is least essential for
survival. In addition, consider that the interval x ∈ (x1:xb) refers to basic needs goods
such as clean water, agricultural goods, health services, and education. Let x ∈ (xb+1:xz)
refer to leisure goods that raise utility above that of basic needs goods. A variety of
studies have analyzed the effect that economic freedom has on basic needs belonging to
the first interval. However, there has been no attempt to determine the effect of private
property rights institutions on adoption of goods that improve quality of life beyond
attainment of basic needs, for goods belonging to the second interval. For this reason the
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IHP may be a better measurement of well being in that it takes into account the
attainment of technological goods.
2.3.2 Measurements of Institutions
Well-defined institutional rules must be accompanied by sound policy in order for there
to be a positive effect on individuals. Political Risk Services (2004) publishes a group of
measurements known as the International Country Risk Guide. Some of these variables
are bureaucracy, corruption, democratic accountability, and rule of law. Norton (2003)
uses the average of the first two to create a variable for quality of government, and the
latter two to measure the “rule space.” Countries with the highest government quality are
Canada, Finland, and Denmark and the lowest quality of government occur in Somalia,
Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The most recent data provided by the
Political Risk Services are slightly different than those obtained by Norton due to recent
revisions. To create a variable measuring the Rule of Law, two other variables are
averaged called Democratic Accountability and Law and Order. Among the countries
with the highest rule of law measurement are Australia, Canada, Denmark and GuineaBissau; Somalia5 and Iraq have the lowest scores. These are unitized between zero and
one.
As mentioned before the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFW) will be
used to measure the “policy space.” The index estimates the degree of economic freedom
for 128 countries. Hong Kong has the highest score in any particular year. However,
Hong Kong will not be part of the sample of this study due to data limitations. In 2000,
Hong Kong was followed by the United States and Singapore and the Democratic

5

Somalia had no government during this period.
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Republic of Congo, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe were the least free. Luxembourg and
Switzerland followed Hong Kong in 1985 whereas Nicaragua, Uganda, and Peru had the
smallest measured economic freedom. Again, the index is derived using an equallyweighted average of five components. These components deal with government size,
legal structure and property rights, money and inflation, freedom to trade internationally,
and regulation. These are explained in detail in the Appendix.
The more each component would be expected to enhance productive activity, the
higher the score. In other words, limited intervention by the government in private
enterprise, sound definition and enforcement of property rights, low inflation and
volatility of domestic currency, limited protectionism, and limited regulation yield high
scores. The components range from zero to ten in the base year. The country with the
highest rating receiving the value of ten. Each of the components consists of many
subcomponents that will not be mentioned specifically. These subcomponents consist of
actual data and surveys conducted for these countries. These variables have also been
normalized between zero and one for the current analysis.
Most studies that have implemented these measurements have used the overall
index value, but some authors have attempted to determine the effect of individual
components on various left-hand-side variables (Ayal, 1998). This idea is intriguing, but
must be approached with prudence. The different components are often highly correlated
creating troubles with collinearity. The Appendix lists the correlation between the five
components as well as the variables constructed from the International Country Risk
Guide. Significant correlation is evident, and collinearity may be severe. The highest
correlation exists between Property and Rule of Law (0.857) followed by
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Qualityofgovernment and Ruleoflaw (0.813), and Property and Qualityofgovernment
(0.798). Also, Property and Trade are highly correlated (0.658). Regressions with these
components may yield underestimated and insignificant t statistics creating difficulty
when analyzing the actual significance of each individual component. In this study the
index will be used in its entirety in some regressions while in others it will be
decomposed in order to analyze the specific effects of each on the quality of life.
The EFW data have been estimated at five-year intervals from 1970 to 2000 and
yearly beginning in 2000 until 2002.

Chain-linked data is available facilitating

longitudinal studies. However, it is difficult to make strong inferences from such studies
since the availability of periods is still lacking. Data is not available for all countries for
the years used in this study. For this reason, unbalanced samples which include all of the
countries with data available in any given year will be run in addition to balanced
samples for the years 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. It is important to note that although
the overall index has been chain-linked by its authors for comparisons through time, the
individual components have not. To deal with this problem, using the scores for the
individual components, the estimated economic freedom index score for each year, and
the chain-linked economic freedom score for each year, chain-linked component scores
are constructed for the purposes of this study. The Appendix provides an algebraic
explanation of how these estimates are carried out.
2.3.3 Other Variables in the Model
Sachs and Warner (1997) contend that geographic and demographic measures are the
main source of different levels of development. In particular, there are four variables that
should be considered.

First, countries that are subjected to tropical climates may
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experience a higher incidence of disease that might affect the ability and incentives
required for more efficient production. For each country they estimate the proportion of
each country that lies in a tropical climate region. This variable, Tropics, ranges from
zero for a country that is located completely outside the tropical region to one for a
country completely within such a region.
Next, Sachs and Warner point out that the inability of individuals to communicate
can create significant costs in market exchange. They calculate the probability that any
two individuals chosen randomly in a given country will speak a different language. This
variable, Ethnic, was calculated in 1980. It is assumed that this has not changed
significantly since that time and stays constant throughout the period of the sample.
South Korea has the lowest probability equal to zero. Thus, there should be no expected
impediments in carrying out transactions due to language barriers. Cameroon, on the
other hand, has a value of 0.89 which would be hypothesized to cause problems in the
market due to language differences. This variable is calculated differently than that
which was used by Norton (2003), but the same in concept. The negative expected sign
in the current paper is equivalent in interpretation to the positive sign expected in the
aforementioned.
Another variable that should be considered is the amount of individuals that live
in urban regions, considering the fact that poverty is more rampant in rural regions.
Singapore has a value of one which should result in higher well being; whereas,
Rwanda’s value of 0.06 should result in lower than normal human development, ceteris
paribus. This variable is named Urban. Finally, they account for all countries that are
landlocked. Norton (2003) and others have used these measurements in their estimates.
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It has been demonstrated that such conditions cannot be ignored. The consequences of
doing so could result in omitted variable bias and inconsistent results.

2.4 Empirical Model
Table 2.1 contains descriptive statistics for the data discussed so far.

The basic

theoretical model that will be tested in this study is akin to that used by Norton (2003)
derived from Epstein’s findings (1985).

The main differences are that this study

estimates panel data and a different dependent variable as a measurement for the quality
of life.
The following benchmark equation will be estimated using Ordinary Least
Squares adjusted for heteroskedasticity:
IHPit
 =ß +ß Landlocked +ß Tropics +ß Urban
ln 
i
2
i
3
i
(1 − IHPit ) 0 1


+ß4 Ethnici+ß5 Governmentqualityit+ß6 Ruleoflawit+ß7 Economicfreedomit
+ uit,

(2.1)

where i=countries (1:78) and t=years (1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000)

All the variables have been explained in some detail along with the rationale
behind their inclusion. The purpose of (2.1) is to observe how the changes in economic
freedom and other variables effect the change in the quality of life measurements. The
log-odds of the IHP (Emes and Hahn, 2001) will be used as the dependent variable.
Depending on the availability of the data, the sample sizes will differ for any given year.
In order to maximize the total observations, unbalanced regressions will be analyzed in
addition to balanced regressions.
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Log odds of IHP
Landlocked
Tropics
Urban
Ethnic
Qualityofgovernment
Ruleoflaw
Economicfreedom
Governmentsize
Property
Money
Trade
Regulation

Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
412
-0.215
1.238
-5.21
4.203
492
0.163
0.369
0
1
372
0.502
0.473
0
1
512
0.509
0.236
0
1
465
0.4
0.289
0.17
0.93
468
0.532
0.245
0
1
463
0.597
0.233
0.222
1
412
0.628
0.145
-5.21
1
492
0.539
0.162
0
1
372
0.569
0.2
0
1
512
0.538
0.204
0
1
465
0.614
0.168
0.17
1
468
0.619
0.139
0
1

The effect of individual components of Economic Freedom will be analyzed as
well. The name of these five variables will be Governmentsize, Governmentsizesquared,
Property, Money, Trade, and Regulation.

Again, higher values for these indicators

indicate higher contributions to economic freedom in a given country and would be
expected to enhance well being. The expected sign of the institutional variables and
Urban are positive (ß5, ß6, ß7, and ß3>0); the expected sign for Landlocked, Tropics, and
Ethnic is negative (ß1, ß2, and ß4<0). Qualityofgovernment and Governmentsize are two
distinct variables. The analysis will include unbalanced regressions to maximize the
number of observations, but balanced regressions will be included as well.
Figure 2.1 displays a plot of the different components of economic freedom on the
IHP. Four of these appear to have a positive relationship with the quality of life with
Property

and

Regulation

possibly

providing

a

more

convincing

exhibition.

Governmentsize appears to have neither a positive relationship nor a negative
relationship. Nonetheless, Governmentsize will be included along with its squared value.
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Figure 2.1 Relationship Between Economic Freedom Components and the
Index of Human Progress

Scatter plots constructed using STATA version 6 on unbalanced panel-data sets from 1985, 1990, 1995,
and 2000

The rationale behind including Governmentsizesquared is the theoretical possibility of a
quadratic relationship between the size of government and quality of life. This has been
done for various studies analyzing the impact of government size on income per capita
and growth. The idea is that there is an initial improvement in wellbeing as the size of
government increases in order to provide protection of property rights and create a legal
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system for good institutions to flourish. However, there is likely a point at which the
government’s size will result in less production in the economy due to crowding out of
productive activities and other reductions in incentives.

The expected signs for

Governmentsize and Governmentsizesquared are positive and negative respectively.

2.5 Empirical Results
Table 2.2 displays the results for estimations of (2.1) for both the balanced and
unbalanced samples. All regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Landlocked is
not significant in either of these regressions. The remaining variables are significant and
as expected. All the institutional variables are significant and positive. The negative sign
on Ethnic and Tropics demonstrates that language barriers as well as the geographic
location in the tropics can have a significant impact on wellbeing. Urban’s positive sign
is consistent with the idea that countries with more urbanized populations enjoy greater
welfare possibly due to economies of scale or migration to the cities as a result of
improvements in agricultural technology.
If the coefficients are any indicator of the relative importance of these variables,
then Urban has the greatest impact (1.593, 1.652) followed by Qualityofgovernment
(1.557, 1.262) and Economic Freedom (1.298, 1.369).

Ruleoflaw (0.516, 0.712) is

positive, but it is significant in only one of the regressions. Tropics (-0.374, -0.485) and
Ethnic (-0.398, -0.375) have the smallest impact of the significant variables. Recall that
all of the variables are normalized between zero and one in order to make the estimates
more comparable.
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Table 2.2 Regression Results with IHP as the Dependent Variable
Unbalanced Sample
Variable
Constant
Landlocked
Tropics
Urban
Ethnic
Qualityofgovernment
Ruleoflaw
Economicfreedom

Coefficient
-2.687***
-0 .011
-0.374***
1.593***
-0.398***
1.557***
0.516
1.298***

Rsquared
Observations
Countries
Years

0.7572
286
78
4

Balanced Sample

Standard Error
0.234
0.156
0.092
0.188
0.132
0.358
0.341
0.328

Coefficient
-2.669***
-0.0059
-0.485***
1.652***
-0.375***
1.262***
0.712*
1.369***

Standard Error
0.252
0.178
0.097
0.195
0.151
0.407
0.381
0.336

0.7696
248
78
4

***1%, **5%, *10% probability for a two-tailed test

Table 2.3 displays the balanced and unbalanced results for the regressions for
(2.1) with economic freedom decomposed into its five main components.
geographic variables yield similar results.

The

Ruleoflaw is again significant in one

regression (0.421, 0.733). Qualityofgovernment is insignificant in both regressions, but it
is still positive. Governmentsize, Governmentsizesquared, Property, and Regulation are
significant. Money and Trade are insignificant. Regulation appears to have the largest
impact of all these (1.745, 1.843) followed by Property (0.95, 1.184). Governmentsize
(-4.745, -6.074) and Governmentsizesquared (4.334, 5.774) yield a peculiar outcome.
Both are significant, but the signs are not consistent with the expected outcome. This
would indicate a U-shaped relationship between the size of government and the quality of
life as opposed to the inverted U shape. This suggests that as the size of government
increases from no government, the quality of life would reduce.

As the size of

government continues to increase, there is a threshold size at which the quality of life
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Table 2.3 Regression Results with IHP as the Dependent Variable and the
Economic Freedom Decomposed
Variable
Constant
Landlocked
Tropics
Urban
Ethnic
Qualityofgovernment
Ruleoflaw
Governmentsize
Governmentsizesquared
Property
Money
Trade
Regulation

Unbalanced Sample
Coefficient
Standard Error
0
.159
-1.536***
-0.0129
0 .114
-0.424***
0 .187
1.489***
0 .132
-0.3688***
0.385
1.287***
0.357
0.421
1.33
-4.745***
1.225
4.334***
0.405
0.950***
0 .259
-0.142
0 .4
-0.6578
0 .537
1.745***
0 .159

Rsquared
Observations
Countries

0.7795
280
62

Balanced Sample
Coefficient
Standard Error
-1.197***
0.442
-0.011
0.206
-.5156***
0.126
1.488***
0.199
-0.371***
0 .137
1.144**
0 .455
0.733*
0 .383
-6.074***
1.438
5.774***
1.347
1.184***
0 .43
-0.252
0.318
-1.145**
0.465
1.843***
0.605

0.7975
232
58

***1%, **5%, *10% probability

would begin to increase as the size of government increases beyond this point. Carlsson
and Lundstrom (2002) obtain a similar finding with regards to the effect of the size of
government component on economic growth. In other words, both small and large
government be optimal in improving quality of life. Such a finding does not make much
sense in theory although the plot in Figure 2.1 could demonstrate many different types of
relationships depending one how one looks at it.
To further analyze this problem, one more set of regressions is analyzed to better
understand the impact of the size of government on the quality of life. The EFW
component measurement for the size of government (Governmentsize) is an average of
government consumption as a percentage of GDP, government owned enterprises as a
percentage of total ownership, transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP, and
government investment as a percentage, and the top marginal tax rate and the threshold at
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which it applies in a given country (Gwartney and Lawson, 2005). Instead of using the
estimated component from the EFW, a simpler measurement is used. Total government
expenditures as a percentage of GDP from the Penn World Tables is considered. This
variable will be called Governmentexpenditures and Governmentexpendituressquared to
avoid confusion with the EFW variable, but it seeks to measure the same thing. Figure
2.2 demonstrates the relationship between this indicator and the IHP in a scatter plot
diagram.
Table 2.4 displays the regressions using this indicator. This table includes four
regressions. The first two and the upper portion include both the non-squared and
squared variable in the first columns and a regression with just the non-squared value for
an unbalanced panel-data set. The reason for this is that the plot in Figure 2.2 seems to
indicate a possible negative relationship. In the first regression, the coefficients again
yield the unexpected signs. However, in this regression, only Governmentexpenditures is
significant.

In the regression without the squared term, Governmentexpenditures is

negative and significant. The remaining policy and institution variables yield similar
results to the previous tables with the exception of Qualityofgovernment which is
insignificant in both regressions. The geographic variables yield the same outcomes as
well in significance and magnitudes.

The lower-portion includes the same two

regressions using a balanced panel-data set. The regression with both the squared and
non-squared values results in the same unexpected signs as in the previous regressions
and both of these coefficients are significant. The negative coefficient in the balanced
panel regression without the squared value is significant. It should be noted that this is
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Figure 2.2 Relationship Between Economic Freedom Components and Index
of Human Progress

the same as indicating that a high value of the EFW component Governmentsize would
be associated with higher IHP since a higher value of Governmentsize implies lower
government expenditures as a share of GDP. The negative sign on the non-squared term
would therefore be expected if the relationship is not quadratic. The remaining results
are consistent with the other regressions with the exception of the fact Property is
not quite significant at conventional levels. Landlocked, Money, and Trade are not
significant in any of the regressions in which they are included.
Regulation and Qualityofgovernment are robust in that they are significant in all
of the regressions in which they are included. Property is significant in four out of the six
and Ruleoflaw is significant in five out of eight. Tropics, Ethnic, and Urban are robust as
well.
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Table 2.4: Regression Results with IHP as the Dependent Variable and the Economic
Freedom Decomposed and Government Expenditure from Penn World Tables
Variable
Constant
Landlocked
Tropics
Urban
Ethnic
Qualityofgovernment
Ruleoflaw
Governmentexpenditure
Governmentexpendituresquared
Property
Money
Trade
Regulation

Coefficient
2.372***
0.009
-0.365***
1.483***
-0.393***
1.247***
0.454***
-2.597**
3.162
0.587
-0.189
-0.383
1.815***

Rsquared
Observations
Countries

0.7781
273
77

Unbalanced Sample
Standard
Error
Coefficient
0.275
-2.522***
0.157
0.009
0.104
-0.359***
0.183
1.5***
0.133
-0.413***
0.364
1.271***
0.361
0.417
1.239
-1.129**
2.884
0.403
0.687*
0.261
-0.19
0.364
-0.398
0.505
1.765

Standard
Error
0.268
0.158
0.104
0.184
0.133
0.362
0.36
0.443
0.398
0.26
0.368
0.499

0.7772
273
77
Balanced Samples

Constant
Landlocked
Tropics
Urban
Ethnic
Qualityofgovernment
Ruleoflaw
Governmentexpenditures
Governmentexpendituressquared
Property
Money
Trade
Regulation
Rsquared
Observations
Countries

Coefficient
-2.548***
-0.0874
-0.372***
1.412***
-0.287*
1.149**
0.9114**
-3.918***
7.035***
0.662
-0.368
-0.549
2.078***

Standard
Error
0.298
0.2
0.101
0.209
0.148
0.447
0.393
1.097
2.082
0.468
0.335
0.398
0.635

Coefficient
-2.801***
-0.086***
-0.365***
1.457***
-0.32***
1.212***
0.839***
-0.808
0.838*
-0.375
-0.575
1.898***

0.7897

0.7857

224

224

56

56

***1%, **5%, *10% probability

Standard
Error
0.299
0.202
0.101
0.206
0.146
0.447
0.39
0.51
0.463
0.342
0.404
0.617

40

2.6. Conclusion
Although many studies have used the Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney
and Lawson, 2005) to analyze its effect on measurements of well being, few have looked
at the effect of the five subcomponents of this index on the quality of life. This study has
demonstrated that trade policy, property rights institutions, and limited regulation are
positively associated with quality of life as measured by the Index of Human Progress
(IHP). The marginal benefit to increasing government involvement in the development
of nations in the form of higher expenditures and tax rates is ambiguous. However, the
benefits from establishing sound property rights and maintaining a legal system that
protects these rights has a far greater impact than government subsidies and transfers and
other policies. The same can be said with regards to low regulation in the market.
This paper provides further empirical evidence of the ideas suggested by North
(1990, 1991), De Soto (2000), and Epstein (1985) that the establishment of well-defined
property rights increases efficiency in the market, provides incentives for individuals to
be productive. Policymakers seeking to alleviate poverty and improve the quality of life
for their constituents would best achieve this objective by developing institutions of welldefined property rights and a legal system that protects these rights. Limited regulation
also appears to be effective in this regard. However, this study merely contributes to the
many studies that indicate that quality institutions are associated with better economic
outcomes. The development of institutions and the internal acceptance of these by the
developing world is a more difficult issue to be resolved.

41

CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND MIGRATION
FLOWS BETWEEN U.S. STATES
“If government is to exercise power, better in the county
than in the state, better in the state than in Washington. If I
do not like what my local community does…I can move to
another local community, and though few may take this
step, the mere possibility acts as a check. If I do not like
what Washington imposes, I have few alternatives in this
world of jealous nations.”
—Milton Friedman, 1962
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CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND MIGRATION
FLOWS BETWEEN U.S. STATES6

3.1 Introduction
Tiebout (1956) provided the foundation for analyzing the effects of local government
policy differentials on migration. As long as consumers are fully mobile and informed,
restrictions to employment opportunities are low, and public services provide no
externalities or diseconomies between communities, consumers convey their preferences
through migration or “voting with their feet.” Hayek (1945) addressed the idea that local
governments are more capable of making better decisions than federal officials due to a
greater access to knowledge concerning the needs of their localities.
Weingast (1995) contends that these two arguments do not completely describe
the benefits of federalism where federalism is defined as a separation of power between
different levels of government. In addition to creating jurisdictional competition as
suggested by Tiebout, federalism can create incentives for political officials to promote
markets which enhance total utility (Qian and Weingast, 1997). When there is sufficient
separation of authority in economic matters between the federal and local governments,
this is known as market-preserving federalism. If a country meets the standards as a
market-preserving federation, migration is likely to result in more efficient policies that
result in higher wellbeing of individuals in the long run.
As there is no natural tendency for firm leadership to respond to the demands of
shareholders (Coase, 1937), there is no reason to assert that political officials efficiently
6

This chapter is based on Ashby (2007)
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respond to the welfare needs of constituents. Effective government institutions align the
incentives of officials to the will of the citizens similar to the manner in which
institutions of firms can induce an effective response to the wellbeing of shareholders.
Federalism is one such institution.

If individuals are free to migrate between

jurisdictions, this serves as a check on government intrusion in economic matters. In a
market-preserving federation, states face a hard budget constraint in that they have no
ability to print currency and little ability to borrow or rely on higher levels of
government. If local governments maintain autonomous power in economic matters
separate from the higher jurisdiction, they have little incentive to bail out inefficient
economic projects or seize wealth from efficient industries. This forces local government
to weigh the benefits versus the costs of such actions since they might drive economically
significant labor and capital to neighboring localities.

When local governments

systematically receive economic assistance from higher levels of government, this
violates the principle of market-preserving federalism endangering the sustainability of
markets and opportunities for efficient utility maximization through migration.
The study of federalism entails important policy implications for enhancing the
welfare of individuals and obtaining more efficient economic outcomes.

Weingast

(1995) demonstrates that the relative federalistic nature of China’s government compared
to Russia has led to economic benefits which have far exceeded its former counterpart in
communism. This being the case, Holcombe (1994) suggests that constitutional rules
limiting authority at the national level are more important than at the local level due to
the relative immobility of individuals. It is conjectured that any policies that limit the
authority of the national government on economic matters will result in sustaining
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market-preservation and create incentives for political officials to align themselves with
the welfare of their constituencies. The question to be addressed in this paper is whether
or not individuals in aggregate react in this manner suggested by Weingast and others. In
other words, this analysis seeks to determine whether individuals in aggregate migrate
toward states with higher economic freedom and estimate the marginal impact of policies
that contribute to economic freedom. Economic freedom impacts the opportunities for
employment and income.

In addition to these indirect benefits, it could be that

individuals receive enhanced utility from economic freedom.
This paper will be divided into four parts.

Section 2 will provide further

discussion of economic freedom and market-preserving federalism and a brief review of
migration theory. Section 3 explains the contribution of this analysis to prior literature
and the model that will be tested in this study. In particular, this paper will analyze the
effects of economic freedom on the migration behavior of the working population in the
lower 48 U.S. states. The Economic Freedom of North America Index (Karabegovic and
McMahon, 2005) will be decomposed into its major components to analyze the impact
that these measures have on migration flows between states. Spatial methods will be
used in this analysis as well. Spatial models take into account spatial dependence and
heterogeneity between observations that are not detected by the standard distance
variables included in gravity models. Porojan (2001) utilizes spatial methods to analyze
trade flows between the European Union and potential members using a modified gravity
model. Other than the above mentioned study, spatial econometrics has been greatly
underutilized in migration research (Cushing and Poot, 2004). Section 4 will analyze the
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empirical results and give a detailed interpretation. Section 5 will conclude the paper
with summary remarks and a discussion of policy implications.

3.2 A Review of the Literature
3.2.1 Economic Freedom and Market-Preserving Fiscal Federalism
Friedman (1962) postulates that economic freedom is important for two reasons. First, it
is an end in itself. Second, it is a “necessary but not sufficient” condition towards
obtaining and maintaining political freedom.

Economic freedom may include

measurements of freedom from coercive property and income taxation, the extent of
government control over the private sector, and the liberty to work at the occupation and
remuneration of one’s choosing and buy or sell goods at prices determined independent
of the government.

In addition to these reasons, market institutions induce political

officials to react to the preferences of the private citizens (Weingast, 1995; Qian and
Weingast, 1997).
Riker (1964) provides two qualifications for a government to be considered a
federation. First, there must be a hierarchy of governments with at least two levels with a
demarcated scope of authority.

Second, the autonomy of each level must be

institutionalized in a manner that makes the restrictions of federalism self-enforcing.
Weingast (1995) further defines a market-preserving federation as one in which the
subnational government possesses primary regulatory authority in economic matters, has
no trade barriers, and faces a hard budget constraint.

According to this definition,

Weingast postulates that the United States acted under this type of system during the
nineteenth century until the 1930s. Although the contemporary United States does not
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qualify according to Weingast’s definition, it is one of the more federalistic nations. The
more economic authority is decentralized, the more efficient the economic outcome will
be through migration.
The indexes of economic freedom are often used to measure the extent to which
economic systems rely on free markets. Numerous studies evaluate the relationship
between economic freedom and measurements of well-being such as income, life
expectancy, and/or education at the international and national level. However, one could
also assert that the propensity to migrate is also a function of individuals seeking to
maximize utility through revealed preference.

This paper analyzes the impact of

government policy that enhances economic freedom on gross migration flows in the
lower 48 U.S. states.
Several studies have been conducted analyzing the effect of economic freedom on
measurements of well-being such as income, poverty, and human development
measurements.

Many of these have been cross-national analyses using either the

Economic Freedom of the World Index published by Gwartney and Lawson (2005)
through the Fraser Institute or that by Miles, et al. (2006) of the Heritage Foundation.
Most find a significant positive relationship between these measures and quality of life.
A positive link of economic freedom has been made with higher incomes per capita and
economic growth (Ali, 1997; Ayal and Karras, 1998; De Haan and Sierman, 1998; Easton
and Walker, 1997; Islam, 1996). Farr, Lord, and Wolfenbarger (1998) and Gwartney,
Lawson, and Holcombe (1999) demonstrate that causality runs in the direction from
economic freedom to economic growth and not vice versa.

Since there is some

disagreement as to the use of income or income growth as legitimate measurements of
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well-being, numerous studies exist that have demonstrated that economic freedom is
associated with higher human development, lower poverty, higher literacy rates, and
other positive aspects of quality of life (Esposto and Zaleski, 1999; Grubel, 1998; Norton,
1998). In addition, Adkins, Moomaw, and Savvides (2002) using panel data demonstrate
that institutions that promote economic freedom lead to higher technical efficiency.
Hanson’s (2003) recent criticism of the findings of studies demonstrating the positive
effects of economic freedom and institutions has received some attention.

Such

criticisms include alleged endogeneity between economic freedom and other variables
such as GDP per capita and the incompatibility of various measurements of economic
freedom. However, Heckelman (2005) argues that the criticisms provided by Hanson are
not made on a thorough analysis of the literature, and that there are flaws to the analysis.
In fact, most of Hanson focuses most of his criticism on just one study (Hanke and
Walters, 1997).
Recently, similar data have been constructed that measure economic freedom in
U.S. states as well as Canadian provinces by Karabegovic and McMahon (2005) of the
Fraser Institute.7 Using these data the authors demonstrate that higher average scores of
economic freedom are significantly associated with higher average incomes and income
growth rates in the North American Region. The data are provided at both a national and
subnational level. The national data measure the extent to which economic freedom is
restricted at all levels of government; the subnational index measures the extent of
7

The Pacific Research Institute has also constructed an index called the U.S. Economic Freedom Index
(McQuillan, 2004). The weights used to construct the overall index are actually taken from a regression
analysis using each state’s own rate of net migration. For this reason, this measurement is of little use to
analyze migration as it is already incorporated into the index itself. In addition, this analysis only observes
each state’s net migration and does not take into account the origin or destination state. Thus, it is
impossible to determine whether the individuals are moving into high freedom states from other high
freedom states or low freedom states.
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Table 3.1 Components of Economic Freedom of North America Index
Area 1: Size of Government
1A: General consumption expenditures by government as a percentage of GSP
1B: Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GSP
1C: Social Security Payments: Employment insurance, workers compensation, and other
pensions as a percentage of GSP
Area 2: Takings and Discriminatory Taxation
2A: Total Tax Burden as a Percentage of GSP: Includes income taxes, consumption
taxes, property and sales taxes, contributions to Social Security plans, and other taxes
2B: Top marginal income tax rate and the income threshold at which it applies
2C: Indirect tax revenue as a percentage of GSP: Includes property taxes, contributions to
Social Security Insurance, and various other taxes
2D: Sales taxes collected as a percentage of GSP: Includes general sales tax revenues as
well as revenue from liquor and tobacco taxes
Area 3: Labor Market Freedom
3A: Minimum wage legislation: Annual income earned by an minimum-wage worker
divided by per-capita GSP
3B: Government Employment as a percentage of total state/provincial employment
3C: Union density
Source: Karabegovic and McMahon (2005)

restriction at the state or provincial and local level.

Table 3.1 displays the ten

components used to calculate this index at the national level. These components are used
to make economic freedom scores for each state from 1981 to 2002. This index consists
of three major components: Size of Government, Takings and Discriminatory Taxation,
and Labor Market Freedom.

The larger the size of the government, the lower the

freedom of individuals to benefit from private enterprise; the greater the tax burden, the
lower the individual freedom to consume or invest; and the more restrictive the labor
market, the more difficult it is for employers and workers to negotiate mutually beneficial
outcomes. A more specific list of these components is included in Table B.1 in the
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Table 3.2 Economic Freedom Rank (1990-95 Average)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
8
8
8
11
12
13
14
14
16
17
18
18
20
21
21
23
24

State
Delaware
Texas
North Carolina
Georgia
New Hampshire
Connecticut
Tennessee
Illinois
Nevada
Wyoming
Louisiana
Indiana
Nebraska
Colorado
Massachusetts
Virginia
Missouri
South Carolina
Utah
South Dakota
California
Kentucky
New Jersey
Iowa

Score
7.97
7.45
7.40
7.28
7.17
7.10
7.10
7.07
7.07
7.07
7.05
7.02
6.98
6.95
6.95
6.92
6.90
6.82
6.82
6.78
6.73
6.73
6.65
6.62

Rank
24
26
27
27
29
30
31
31
33
34
35
36
36
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

State
Kansas
Vermont
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Arizona
Arkansas
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Florida
Alabama
Idaho
Michigan
Oklahoma
Maryland
New York
Washington
Oregon
Mississippi
New Mexico
Rhode Island
North Dakota
Maine
West Virginia
Montana

Score
6.62
6.60
6.57
6.57
6.53
6.52
6.50
6.50
6.47
6.45
6.43
6.40
6.40
6.37
6.32
6.23
6.22
6.13
6.10
5.92
5.90
5.85
5.43
5.37

Source: Karabegovic and McMahon (2005)

Appendix. Note that 2A contains elements from 2C and 2D. For this reason, this
analysis will not include 2C and 2D when analyzing the separate components. 2A, which
measures the total tax burden, will be sufficient. This will be discussed below in the
discussion of the variables to be analyzed.
Table 3.2 displays the rankings of states by economic freedom score.

The

averages are taken from 1990 to 1995 since this is the period that will be used in the
analysis.

Delaware had the highest level of economic freedom during the period

followed by Texas, North Carolina, Georgia, and New Hampshire. Montana experienced
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the lowest level of economic freedom followed by West Virginia, Maine, North Dakota,
and Rhode Island. Interestingly, it seems that no study has been carried out to analyze
the effect that economic freedom has on gross migration or the migration decision of
individuals at the state level. At the international level, Melkumian (2004) finds that
lower economic freedom in non-U.S. countries is a significant determinant of migration
to the United States.
3.2.2Migration
Gravity models are often utilized in regional economics to analyze the effects that
distance and population size of localities have on migratory forces (Borjas, 1989;
Greenwood, 1975). Such models were derived from the equation for gravitational force
used in the physical sciences. An unconstrained gravity equation would be

M ij =

β β
GPi 1 Pj 2

Dijα

(3.1)

(Greenwood, 1997) where Mij denotes gross migration from location i to location j, G is a
constant, Pi and Pj represent the population in locations i and j, and Dij is the distance
between these two locations. By taking logs on both sides and including other control
variables a reduced-form model can be derived to analyze migratory behavior
empirically:

mij=α0+ α1 pi +α2 pj+α3 yi+α4 yj+α5 dij +z(.) + εij

(3.2)
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Note that the lower case variables in (3.2) represent the log form of the coinciding upper
case variables in (3.1). yi and yj represent income for both locations and dij denotes the
travel costs between the localities. Since this is difficult to measure, the shortest flying
distance is often used as a proxy variable (Borjas, 1987). The variable z(.) includes the
attributes of the origin and destination localities, and εij serves as the conventional error
term. Some of these attributes may include economic conditions (Borjas, 1989) or
measurements of political and/or civil freedoms (Gastil, 1987). All variables are in log
terms, although sometimes in empirical work logs or a combination of logs and levels are
used.
Greenwood (1997) provides a survey of literature pertaining to internal migration
in developed nations. It is believed that the United States and Canada have higher
propensities to migrate than other developed nations. Two major trends have been
observed in the United States.

First, the South has had the greatest net migration

(inmigrants minus outmigrants) in recent years. Second, populations in metropolitan
areas are increasing more slowly than in non-metropolitan areas.
The data for migration are obtained from the U.S. Census of Population and
Housing (2000). The survey is available every ten years. These data provide a state-tostate estimate of the total number of individuals that moved in the final five years of the
given decade (i.e., 1995 to 2000, etc.). The destination state, as well as the state of
origin, is provided. This means that for each of the 48 lower states there are gross
migration estimates for 48 possible destinations including the possibility for individuals
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to remain in the state of origin.8 Migration from individuals inside the United States to
outside of the country is not considered as well as all inward migration from foreign
countries. Migration that occurs within each state is also not counted. This amounts to
2,304 observations for the 2000 survey.9

There has been debate in the migration

literature about whether to use gross or net migration. However, by design the gravity
model measures gross outmigration from origin to destination (Greenwood et al., 1991).
Rather than using the total state-to-state migration flows as a dependent variable,
migration flows for the population as a percentage of the population at risk is often used.
The population at risk is defined as the population at the beginning of the migration
period. Typically, the total number of outmigrants in any given state is added to the
population over five years old in 2000, and the number of inmigrants is subtracted from
the population over five years old in 2000. The log-odds of working-age migrants from
an origin state to the destination state as a percent of the working-age population at risk in
the origin state will be used in this study. This will be explained below.
The manner of analyzing migration behavior is in terms of utility maximization.
All else equal, individuals will move to a new location if the perceived utility from doing
so is greater than the utility of not moving. In a sense, migration is a better measurement
of utility improvements than other measurements of well-being because preferences are
manifested through revealed actions. Douglas (1997) postulates that there is a consensus
about certain attributes that improve utility and desirability of some locations compared
8

9

The Economic Freedom of North America Index does not provide a score for the District of Columbia.

There were no migrants from Rhode Island to North Dakota and vice versa between 1995 and 2000 as
estimated by the U.S. Census survey. Unfortunately, since the log of these numbers will need to be taken
for the analysis, values of zero would create problems. To deal with this problem, the minimum positive
value was assigned to these observations.
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to others.

There may be certain idiosyncratic characteristics that either increase or

diminish a location’s attractiveness such as closeness to family. Aggregate migration
patterns between locations are assumed on average to reflect the consensus as to relative
standard of living in those locations. However, on average the idiosyncratic deviations
from the consensus cancel themselves out. Greenwood et al. (1991) and Douglas and
Wall (1993) also approach migration in this manner.
Various studies have analyzed the impact of public policy on migration. Charney
(1993) provides a survey of such studies. Other studies include Cebula (1990), Clark and
Hunter (1992), and Saltz (1998).

3.3 The Model
The contribution of this study is to analyze the effect that the policies that contribute to
economic freedom have on migration flows between states.

It is expected that

individuals migrate from states with lower economic freedom to states with higher
economic freedom after controlling for various other factors of migration. In order to
obtain consistent results, it is important to consider the possibility of spatial relationships
between observations (Lesage, 1998). It could be argued that the distance variable in the
gravity model will account for the spatial effects. This might very well be the case.
However, it is possible that there are other spatial effects that are not fully captured by
the distance variables. Therefore, it is necessary to test for spatial effects to determine
whether or not a spatial estimator should be used. A general statistical model of spatial
dependency is demonstrated in (3) below:
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y = ρW1 y + xβ + u
u = λW2 u + ε

(3.3)

ε ~ N (0,σ 2 I n )
y is a column vector of the dependent variable being analyzed. W1 and W2 are square
weight matrices or contiguity matrices that measure proximity to a given observation.
The matrix labeled x contains the explanatory variables, ß is a matrix for the measured
coefficients, u is the error term, and
distribution and a mean of zero.

g is the error term of u with a standard normal

Specifically, the model that will be estimated in this

study is as follows:

 ( Migrationrateij ) 
 ( Migrationrateij ) 
Ln 
α
Stay
+β
Constant+
ρ
W
Ln


=
0
ij
0

1 − ( Migrationrateij ) 
1 − ( Migrationrateij ) 
+β1 EconomicFreedomj/Economicfreedomi +β2 Ln Populationj/Populationi
+β3 Ln Densityj/Densityi+ β4 Ln Incomej/Incomei

(3.4)

+β5 [Employmentgrowthj-Employmentgrowthi]+β6 Retiredj/Retiredi
+ β7 Heatingdaysj/Heatingdaysi +β8 Precipitationj/Precipitationi
+*1 Distanceij +*2 Distancesquaredij +λWu+gij

The subscript i is used to indicate the origin state and j is used for the destination state.
The contiguity matrices (W) in Equation 3.4 are row standardized. In other words, the
sum of the values given to each contiguous state for a given state is equal to one. Since
Alabama has four contiguous states, a value of 0.25 will be given to Florida, Georgia,
Mississippi, and Tennessee. This is a more intuitive method of measuring the impact of
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adjacency than including a dummy variable for each possible contiguous relationship for
a given geographical region. Some states obviously have fewer contiguous relationships
than others. It is possible for both weight matrices (W1 and W2) to be the same, although
this is not necessary. In this study they are constrained to be equal (W1=W2=W).
Applying spatial econometrics to a gravity model with multiple origins requires
some adjustments due to the nature of the problem being analyzed. Typically, a gravity
model considers all the possible destinations of migration for each observation excluding
all cases in which the origin is also the destination. In the case of this study, since 48
states are being analyzed, this would mean that there would normally be 47 possible
destinations for all 48 states resulting in a total of 2,256 observations. However, this
produces a problem in constructing the weight matrices since the matrix must be square.
Each individual row will represent the contiguous relationship of a destination state. If
this particular destination state has a contiguous relationship with the origin state, this
will positively impact migration to this state ( ρ >0).
There must be an observation included for cases in which i=j (origin=destination).
The question arises as to what should be included in this situation.

Such observations

are only included in order to perform spatial estimation. The purpose of the gravity
model is to analyze the determinants of migration flows. For these observations, the total
working-age population in 1995 will be used.10 Since there are 48 states in the analysis,
there are obviously 48 “stayers.” The remaining 2,256 observations will be known as
“movers.” Stayij is a dummy variable equal to one for all “stayers” observations where
i=j and zero otherwise. By including this dummy, it is possible to separate the effects for
10

The data is divided into 17 age groups. This study includes individuals age 20 to 59 in 1995. These
groups are 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, and 12 according to the U.S. Census age classifications.
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the non-mover while still enabling construction of a square weight matrix.11 This results
in 2,304 observations and a 2,304 by 2,304 square weight matrix characterized by an
identical contiguity matrix located on each diagonal block with all positions above and
below the diagonal blocks filled with zeros. The contiguity matrix for the first 48
observations (Alabama and its 48 possible destinations including the possibility of
staying in Alabama) will be located in the upper-diagonal block of the matrix where each
row measures the contiguous relationship of each possible destination state for
individuals living in Alabama in 1995. Likewise, the lower diagonal block will contain
the contiguity matrix for all 48 of the potential destinations from Wyoming.
The coefficient labeled ρ (rho) in Equations 3 and 4 measures the effect that
neighboring observations have on the dependent variable and λ (lambda) measures
correlation in the error term.

If

ρ and/or λ are different from zero, then spatial

dependence exists (Lesage, 1998). There are three estimators in particular which can be
used. If ρ ≠ 0 and λ=0, then the model is reduced to a spatial autoregressive model
(SAR) with a normally distributed error term. In this case the coefficient estimates of
ordinary least squares (OLS) are biased and inconsistent. If ρ = 0 and λ ≠ 0 , then there
is correlation in the error term known as a spatial error model (SEM). The estimated
OLS coefficients are consistent, but inefficient. Finally, if both coefficients are different
than zero, then the model is a general spatial model (GSAR). In this case the OLS
estimates are also biased and inconsistent. Surprisingly, spatial issues have not been

11

OLS regressions were run to test whether or not this is the case. First, a regression was analyzed which
only included the movers with a constant. Second, a regression was run which included the dummy
variables without a constant. It was found that the coefficients were qualitatively the same. Thus, the
dummy variable Stayij effectively controls for the impact of “stayers.”
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considered much in the migration literature (Cushing and Poot, 2004). Porojan (2001) is
an exception in providing an analysis of trade flows between the European Union and
potential trade partners using an adapted gravity model much different than that used in
this paper.
Generally, a SAR will be estimated first followed by the SEM. If rho and lambda
are both determined to be significantly different from zero, a GSAR which allows the
possibility of both spatial dependence and spatial autocorrelation will be most
appropriate. There are further tests to determine whether spatial autocorrelation exists
including the Moran’s Information Statistic and the Likelihood Ratio test. The null
hypothesis of both of these tests is that there is no spatial autocorrelation. The Moran’s I
statistic is constructed as follows:

I=[e’We]/e’e

(3.5)

where W is the weight matrix in Equation 4 where e is the residuals from OLS. The
Likelihood Ratio test analyzes the difference between the log likelihood estimates from
OLS and SEM. If either of these statistics is estimated to be significantly different from
zero, then the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of spatial autocorrelation.
Both tests are conducted in this study. The Moran’s I and the Likelihood Ratio
tests yielded respective values of 38.11 and 2004.4, both of which far exceed the critical
values for conventional levels of significance.12

12

The null hypothesis of no spatial

The tests were run in Matlab Version 7and MS Windows XP 2002. For a more thorough discussion of
these tests see Spatial Econometrics (Lesage, 1998). In particular, Equations 3.3 and 3.5 are taken from
this source.
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autocorrelation is rejected. In addition, a SAR model was estimated which yielded a
value of rho that is significantly different from zero. These outcomes indicate that the
GSAR model is the appropriate model of the three for consistent and more efficient
results. Equation 4 is a GSAR model. Regressions were analyzed for the SAR, SEM,
and the GSAR, but for the sake of conciseness only the GSAR are reported herein.13
Schultz (1982) suggests that a polychotomous logistic method should be used for
estimation of a gravity model. For this reason the dependent variable is specified in this
manner. The log-odds ratio is found by taking the log of the probability of migrating
from one location to another divided by the rate of nonmigration between these two
locations. Migrationrateij is found by dividing the amount of working-age migrants from
the origin to the destination locality by the origin population at the beginning of the
migration period. Table B.1 in the Appendix provides a detailed explanation of the
variables and data sources used in this study.
Often logs are taken on the independent variables. In this analysis, logs are
taken with respect to relative total populations, population densities, and incomes. The
remaining variables are in levels. The explanatory variables are actually beginning of the
period values since these are likely to be the driving forces of migration. Ln Populationj
/Populationi and Ln Densityj/Densityi, are the values taken from 1995. The calculation of
Populationj/Populationi has been explained above in discussing how to determine the at
risk population. Densityj/ Densityi is the population densities calculated by dividing the
total population in 1995 by total area in of the state in square miles.

13

However, the other estimates are available upon request.
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Incomej/Incomei is the mean income per capita averages between 1990 and 1995.
Income per capita is easily obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis as are the
Gross State Deflators (GSD). However, GSD is not useful for comparing the actual
levels of cost of living between states. In the base year of its calculation (2000), the
deflator is constrained to be equal to 100 for all states. Using this to compare the cost of
living between states will result in faulty conclusions. For instance, the GSD implies that
West Virginia, North Dakota, Kansas, and Oklahoma experienced higher costs of living
in 1990 than California. However, the GSD may be reasonably used to measure the
changes in cost of living. Up until 1990, a more reasonable measurement of cost-ofliving levels, the Geographical Cost of Living Index (GCLI), was constructed by
McMahon and Chang (1991).

It uses various methods to construct this index.

In

particular it is found that housing, due to its immobility, is the main driver of cost-ofliving differences between states. Using the GSD and the 1990 levels constructed by the
GCLI, the cost-of-living values are estimated for each state from 1990 to 1995 for this
analysis. These values are used to convert income from 1990 to 1995 to real income per
capita and the mean during this period is taken for each state.
Economicfreedomj/ Economicfreedomi is the average values between 1990 and
1995. Economicfreedomj/ Economicfreedomi in Equation 4 can be interpreted in two
ways since regressions will be analyzed which include the index as a whole as well as
the individual components of the index. In the former case it will be a 2,304 by 1 vector
and the coefficient β1 will be the estimate of the impact of relative economic freedom on
migration flows. In the latter case it will be interpreted as a 2,304 by 8 matrix and the
coefficient β1 will be a vector of the eight estimated coefficients of each component of
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economic freedom. In particular, the variable names of the eight components analyzed
are

Governconsi/Governconsj,

Taxrevenuesj/Taxrevenuesi,

Transfersj/Transfersi,

Socialsecurityj/Socialsecurityi,

Marginaltaxj/Marginaltaxi,

Governmentemployj/Governmentemployi,

and

Minwagej/Minwagei,

Uniondensityj/Uniondensityi.

These

variables coincide with 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, and 3C in Table 1. Again, 2C and
2D are not included in the decomposition because both of these are included as part of 2A
and are therefore not deemed to be redundant.
It should be noted that the economic freedom components will not be included as
scores with the exception of 2B, the highest marginal income tax rate and the
corresponding threshold at which it applies. For the remaining components, the raw data
used to make the scores will be included.

The interpretation of these is different.

Relatively high levels of government consumption and higher marginal tax rates would
coincide with lower economic freedom scores.

Expecting Economicfreedomj/

Economicfreedomi to positively impact migration flows is equivalent to expecting
Governconsi/Governconsj and Transfersj/Transfersi to negatively impact migration flows.
Since both the tax rate and the threshold are important when considering the tax
burden, merely including the tax rate will not sufficiently determine the impact. In order
to analyze the burden in terms of the marginal tax rate and its threshold, the average score
taken between 1990 and 1995 for each state is arbitrarily divided by ten. A higher score
in this case would indicate a higher tax burden and a lower score a lower tax burden.
This is done in order to make this variable more comparable to the other components and
avoid confusion when interpreting the regression estimates.

The analysis of the

economic freedom components demonstrates the mixed response that individuals may
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have to economic freedom indicators.

Freedom in terms of carrying out economic

activities may be attractive to some, but some aspects of this freedom may conflict with
other government policies that also tend to attract individuals such as income transfers
and social programs.14 In aggregate, what are the effects of economic freedom? In theory
the aggregate effect could be negative, positive or insignificant.
Employmentgrowthratej-Employmentgrowthi is the difference in employment
growth between 1990 and 1995 between the destination and the origin state. Using
differences is a more logical way to analyze this variable than looking at relative rates of
employment growth. When dividing Employmentgrowthratej by Employmentgrowthi, it
creates problems with the data when one of the observations is negative. For instance, if
Employmentgrowthj

is

2

and

Employmentgrowthi

is

1,

then

Employmentgrowthj/Employmentgrowthi is 2. However, if Employmentgrowthi were
negative

and

even

lower

with

a

Employmentgrowthj/Employmentgrowthi would be -2.

value

of

Retiredj/Retiredi

-1,

then

is the 1990

census values and is the relative percentage of individuals that are over 65.
Precipitationj/Precipitationi is the relative difference between states in the amount of
precipitation

in

inches

taking

the

averages

between

1971

and

2000.

Heatingdaysj/Heatingdaysi is the difference in the number of heating days. Heating days
are found by taking all days in which the temperature is below 65 degrees Fahrenheit in
different regions of a state and adding the difference between the temperatures and 65
degrees. For instance, a day with a temperature of 60 degrees would contribute five

14

I would like to thank one of the anonymous referees for encouraging me to consider this fact.
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Maximum

Minimum

Ln [Migrationrateij/(1-Migrationrateij)]

-5.198

1.518

0.908

-10.666

Ln Populationj/Populationi

0.000

1.346

3.909

-3.909

Ln Densityj/Densityi

0.000

1.788

5.223

-5.223

Ln Incomej/Incomei
Employmentgrowthj-Employmentgrowthi
Economicfreedomj/Economicfreedomi

0.000
0.000
1.006

0.121
4.735
0.108

0.386
13.640
1.484

-0.386
-13.640
0.674

Retiredj/Retiredi

1.020

0.204

2.103

0.475

Heatingdaysj/Heatingdaysi

1.304

1.276

13.612

0.073

Precipitationj/Precipitationi

1.260

0.935

6.331

0.158

Governmentconsj/Governmentconsi

1.023

0.221

2.241

0.446

Transfersj/Transfersi

1.097

0.501

4.475

0.223

Socialsecurityj/Socialsecurityi

1.035

0.277

2.569

0.389

Taxrevenuesj/Taxrevenuesi

1.007

0.121

1.420

0.704

Marginaltaxj/Marginaltaxi

1.023

0.221

1.808

0.553

Minwagej/Minwagei

1.022

0.213

1.951

0.513

Governmentemployj/Governmentemployi

1.022

0.218

1.932

0.518

Uniondensityj/Uniondensityi

1.151

0.644

5.259

0.190

Distanceij

1,181.173

Distancesquaredij

1,916x10

3

722.173
2,111x10

3,138
3

9,847x10

0.000
3

0.000

N=2,304

heating days to the annual total whereas a day with a temperature of 70 would contribute
zero heating days. The lower the number, the warmer is the climate.
The distance variables Distanceij and Distancesquaredij, measure some of the
costs of traveling from any given distance. The distance between principal cities for any
two states is used. There are several reasons why the relationship might be nonlinear
justifying the inclusion of the squared values (McCann, 2001). gij is the error term. The
expected signs of these two variables are *1<0 and *2>0. The distance variables are not
included in logs due to the nature of this analysis. Clearly, the distance between states for
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all “Stayers” is equal to zero making log transformation impossible (i.e., the distance
between Alabama and Alabama is zero, etc.)
It is expected that individuals move towards relatively highly populated regions
(ß2>0) and away from relatively dense regions (ß3<0). It is expected that individuals
migrate towards relatively higher mean incomes (ß4>0), higher employment growth
(ß5>0), a higher percentage of retired individuals (ß6>0), warmer weather (ß7<0), and less
precipitation (ß8<0). The justification for inclusion of Retiredj/Retiredi and the expected
positive sign is to pick up any unmeasured determinants of wellbeing not picked up by
the remaining variables.
Table 3.3 includes summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables
including the mean, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum values. The descriptive
statistics for migration flows do not include “stayer” observations in the calculations.

3.4 Empirical Results
Table 3.4 displays the results for the estimation of Equation 4 using a general spatial
autoregressive estimator (GSAR) with the log-odds of migration as the dependent
variable. Most of the results are as expected. The first column includes all of the
variables in Equation 4 and the second column excludes income and employment growth
to observe the impact of economic freedom without these indicators of economic
wellbeing.15

15

The impact of relative median house prices was analyzed in some regressions, but it was insignificant.
The cost-of-living measurements used to calculate real mean income per capita are highly correlated with
house prices since this is the main determinant of cost-of-living differences between states. For this reason,
median house price was deemed to be an unnecessary inclusion.
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EconomicFreedomj/Economicfreedomi, which is the variable of most interest in
this study, yields the expected positive coefficient (0.769) and is significant. It is also
significant and positive (1.617) in the second column when income and employment
growth are excluded.

Economic theory and empirical evidence demonstrate that

economic freedom influences income levels and the growth of employment. States with

Table 3.4 GSAR Estimation for Equation 3.4 with the Log-Odds Ratio of the Migration
Rate as the Dependent Variable
Note: the i subscript indicates origin state and the j subscript indicates destination state
Variable
EconomicFreedomj/EconomicFreedomi
Ln Populationj/Populationi
Ln Densityj/Densityi
Ln Incomej/Incomei
Employmentgrowthj-Employmentgrowthi
Retiredj/Retiredi
Heatingdaysj/Heatingdaysi
Precipitationj/Precipitationi
Distanceij
Distancesquaredij

Coefficients (t-statistic absolute values)
0.769***
1.617***
(3.67)
(8.40)
-0.133***
-0.095***
(7.82)
(5.62)
-0.073***
-0.118***
(3.10)
(5.60)
1.643***
(8.91)
0.056***
(8.48)
0.796***
0.879***
(8.43)
(9.06)
0.08***
0.078***
(3.38)
(3.24)
-0.061
-0.157***
(1.47)
(3.74)
-0.002***
-0.002***
(12.66)
(12.69)
6x10-6***
6x10-6***
(10.84)
(10.88)

Stayij (Dummy for non-movers)

2.533***

2.543***

Constant

(29.23)
-5.059***
(19.88)

(28.83)
-5.932***
(24.04)

0.057***
(7.188)
0.73***
(87.16)
0.875

0.045***
(4.02)
0.729***
(86.81)
0.868

rho (spatial dependence)
lambda (spatial autocorrelation)
Adjusted Rsquared
N=2,304

***1%, **5%, *10% probability for a two-tailed test
Regressions were run using Matlab Version 7 and MS Windows XP 2002
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persistently more economic freedom will experience higher levels of income and more
rapid employment growth. When the income and employment growth variables are
included in the model along with economic freedom as in column one of Table 3.4, this
indirect impact of economic freedom via income and employment growth is not as
apparent. If this indirect impact is important, the estimated impact of economic freedom
will be substantially larger in an estimate that excludes the income and employment
growth variables. Column two clearly demonstrates this to be the case. When the
income and employment growth variables are excluded from the model, the economic
freedom variable is significant with a much higher coefficient. The implication is that
states with more economic freedom achieve higher income levels and grow more rapidly
and that these indirect effects of economic freedom also influence migration choices.16
The negative coefficients on Ln Populationj/Populationi (-0.133, -0.095) and Ln
Densityj/Densityi (-0.073, -0.118) are consistent with the trend of movement away from
more populated areas in the United States.

The estimate of Ln Incomej/Incomei is

positive and significant (1.643). As the relative income of the destination state to the
origin state increases by 1%, the odds ratio of migrating to the destination state increases
by about 1.6% according to these estimates. Employmentgrowthj.-Employmentgrowthi is
positive and significant (0.056) as well.
The positive coefficients on Retiredj/Retiredi (0.796, 0.879) indicate that a higher
percentage of retired individuals attracts migrants.

Both of the climate variables

Heatingdaysj/Heatingdaysi (0.08, 0.078) and Precipitationj/Precipitationi

16

(-0.061,

All of the control variables in Equation 4 with the exception of income and employment growth were
regressed on income and employment growth, respectively. The coefficient for economic freedom was
positive and significant as expected.
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-0.157) are significant, and the distance variables Distanceij and Distancesquaredij, are
significant with the expected signs (-0.002 and 0.6x10-6 respectively).17
Table 3.5 includes the estimates of Equation 3.4 when decomposing the index into
the eight components of economic freedom explained above. Again, these variables are
not calculated scores with the exception of Marginaltaxj/Marginaltaxi which is explained
above. They are the actual values of the indicators used to calculate the scores. As
discussed above, the coefficients of these should be interpreted differently. For instance,
a high level of government consumption and a relatively high tax burden would coincide
with a lower economic freedom score. The first column includes relative income and
employment growth whereas the second column excludes these.
All of the components are significant in both regressions with the exception of
Transferj/Transfersi and Taxrevenuesj/Taxrevenuesi which are not significant in either
equation. Governconsi/Governconij (0.377, 0.262) and Socialsecurityj/Socialsecurityi
(0.655, 0.683) both have a positive impact on migration flows. This seems to indicate
that relatively higher government expenditures and transfer payments seem to attract
individuals in aggregate. On the other hand, Marginaltaxj/Marginaltaxi (-0.193, -0.324),
Minwagej/Minwagei (-1.323, -1.362), Governmentemployj/Governmentemployi (-1.109,
-1.151), and Uniondensityj/Uniondensityi (-0.156, -0.185) tend to result in a lower
likelihood of migration to a given state. The complete findings indicate that individuals
tend to move to states with lower tax burdens in the form of lower marginal tax rates for
the highest income bracket and high income thresholds and policies that are less

17

The output from Matlab only provides six decimals. However, this coefficient is statistically significant.
For this reason, Distancesquaredij is rescaled for estimation purposes.
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Table 3.5 GSAR Estimation for Equation 4 with the Log-Odds Ratio of the
Migration Rate as the Dependent Variable and Economic Freedom Decomposed
Note: the i subscript indicates origin state and the j subscript indicates destination state
Variable
Coefficients (t-statistic absolute values)
Governmentconsj/Governmentconsi
0.377***
0.262**
(3.64)
(2.59)
Transfersj/Transfersi
-0.017
-0.083
(0.291)
(1.41)
Socialsecurityj/Socialsecurityi
0.655***
0.683***
(5.01)
(5.23)
Taxrevenuesj/Taxrevenuesi
-0.324
-0.064
(1.04)
(0.277)
Marginaltaxj/Marginaltaxi
-0.193**
-0.324***
(2.29)
(4.33)
Minwagej/Minwagei
-1.323***
-1.362***
(6.17)
(8.15)
Governmentemployj/Governmentemployi
-1.088***
-1.151***
(8.38)
(8.93)
Uniondensityj/Uniondensityi
-0.156***
-0.185***
(3.82)
(4.50)
Ln Populationj/Populationi
-0.105***
-0.1***
(6.02)
(5.73)
Ln Densityj/Densityi
-0.159***
-0.214***
(6.03)
(8.87)
Ln Incomej/Incomei
0.743**
(2.19)
Employmentgrowthj-Employmentgrowthi
0.04***
(5.28)
Retiredj/Retiredi
0.339***
0.246**
(2.92)
(2.13)
Heatingdaysj/Heatingdaysi
0.083***
0.076***
(3.44)
(3.14)
Precipitationj/Precipitationi
0.004
-0.021
(0.09)
(0.474)
Distanceij
-0.002***
-0.002***
(10.91)
(11.07)
Distancesquaredij
6x10-6***
6x10-6***
(9.43)
(9.56)
Stayij (Dummy for non-movers)
2.499***
2.49***
(27.20)
(27.19)
Constant
-1.719***
1.468***
(6.10)
(5.21)
rho (spatial dependence)
0.076***
0.074***
(6.97)
(6.92)
lambda (spatial autocorrelation)
0.73***
0.73***
(84.41)
(86.18)
Adjusted Rsquared
0.8809
0.8795
N=2,304
***1%, **5%, *10% probability for a two-tailed test
Regressions were run using Matlab Version 7 and MS Windows XP 2002
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constraining in terms of labor and hiring decisions. Heatingdaysj/Heatingdaysi is positive
and significant which is not in accordance with the hypothesized outcome. This result
implies

that

individuals

tend

towards

states

with

colder

climates.

Precipitationj/Precipitationi is insignificant. All the remaining coefficients are as expected

in terms of signs and significance. The estimates for the spatial effects (rho and lambda)
are significant in both regressions as expected.
As far as the magnitudes of the coefficients in column one is considered in Table
3.5, Ln Incomej/Incomei (0.743) has the greatest impact on migration followed by Ln
Populationj/Populationi
Minwagej/Minwagei

(-0.105).
(-1.323)

For
has

the
the

variables
greatest

estimated
impact

in

followed

levels,
by

Governmentemployj/Governmentemplyi (-1.088), Socialsecurityj/Socialsecurityi (0.655),
and Governmentconsj/Governmentconsi (0.377). However, due to the difference in the
units used in these measurements, it is not easy to determine which indicators are more
important in discovering the determinants of migration.

The interpretation of the

coefficients of logged variables can be interpreted as the elasticities of the likelihood of
migrating from any given state i to any given state j with respect to the given variable.
For example, the coefficient (-0.105) on Ln Populationj/Populationi is interpreted as the
percentage change in the odds ratio of migrating from state i to state j given a one-percent
increase in the relative population between state j and state i. The coefficient of the
variables in levels is the percentage increase in the odds ratio of migration given a oneunit increase in the variable. An increase in Minwagej/Minwagei of one unit would be
estimated to decrease the odds ratio of migration by about 1.3%.
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Table 3.6 displays an effort to make these impacts more comparable.

The

marginal impact of increasing a given measure by the estimated standard deviation of
each measure is analyzed instead of analyzing the effects of a one-percent or one-unit
change in the variables. In addition, the variables are divided into two groups depending
on whether they are estimated in logs or in levels. This may be a more intuitive analysis
in terms of comparing coefficients. The coefficients in Table 3.6 are taken from the
estimates shown in the first column of Table 3.5 and the standard deviations are taken
from the summary statistics in Table 3.3. The asterisks indicate that coefficients are
statistically significant. For instance, if the distance between two states were to change
by one mile, the likelihood of migration occurring between these states will only decrease
by -0.002% which would appear to be minimal despite the significance of the distance
variables. However, if the impact of distance is analyzed in terms of the standard
deviation (approximately 722 miles), then the likelihood of migration occurring decreases
by approximately -1.1%.
In terms of standard deviations, distance seems to be the most important
determinant of migration compared to all of the variables in levels. Minwagej/Minwagei
(-0.282) has the greatest impact out of the economic freedom components followed by
Governmentemployj/Governmentemployi

(-0.237)

and

Socialsecurityj/Socialsecurityi

(0.182). Employmentgrowthj-Employmentgrowthi seems to have a larger impact than
most of these (0.189).

This is logical since individuals are likely driven more by

employment opportunities than other factors. However, it is likely that policies related to
labor freedom and taxation are important determinants of employment.
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Table 3.6: Analysis of a Standard Deviation Increase in the Values of the Variables
Variable

Coefficient
(1)

Standard Deviation
(2)

Impact of Standard
Deviation Increase
(1)*(2)

Logs:
Populationj/Populationi
Densityj/Densityi
Incomej/Incomei
Levels:
Governmentconsj/Governmentconsi
Transfersj/Transfersi
Socialsecurityj/Socialsecurityi
Taxrevenuesj/Taxrevenuesi
Marginaltaxj/Marginaltaxi
Minwagej/Minwagei
Governmentemployj/Governmentemployi
Uniondensityj/Uniondensityi
Employmentgrowthj/Employmentgrowthi
Retiredj/Retiredi

Heatingdaysj/Heatingdaysi
Precipitationj/Precipitationi
Distance (*1)
Distancesquared (*2)
Total Impact of Distance =
(*1x722.17)+(*2x722.172)

-0.105*
-0.159*
0.743*

1.346
1.788
0.121

-0.141
-0.285
0.09

0.377*
-0.017
0.655*
-0.324
-0.193*
-1.323*
-1.088*
-0.156*
0.04*
0.339*
0.083*
0.004
-0.002*
0.6x10-6*

0.221
0.501
0.277
0.121
0.221
0.213
0.218
0.644
4.735
0.204
1.276
0.935
-

0.083
-0.009
0.182
-0.039
-0.043
-0.282
-0.237
-0.101
0.189
0.069
0.106
0.004

722.17

-1.131

*Coefficient estimates significant in column one of Table 5

The impact of economic freedom as measured by the Economic Freedom of North
America Index is positive and significant in determining migration flows. However, this
could be due to its relationship to the income and employment variables. Given the
results in the second column of Table 3.4, it would be difficult to conclude that economic
freedom does not, at the very least, impact migration flows indirectly.
Most of the components do have a significant impact according to the estimates in
this paper. Governmentconsj/Governmentconsi appear to yield a negative response. This
finding might be interpreted to indicate that transfers of income and higher government
expenditures are effective means of increasing the welfare of individuals. Yet the impact
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of high union density, minimum wage laws, and a high percentage of individuals working
in the public sector is negative. In other words, a larger government may attract many
individuals, but it also appears to motivate outward migration of valuable labor and
capital. For instance, as the government increases its influence and spending it must hire
more individuals from the private sector. Large government expenditures decrease labor
freedom which results in outward migration of many productive individuals. This is
merely one interpretation of the results.
In terms of market-preserving federalism, these outcomes are not necessarily
desirable. As mentioned above, the United States is considered to be one of the more
federalistic nations. Yet, it does not meet the standards set by Weingast (1995) as a
market-preserving federation. It fails in this regard due to the lack of separation of
authority in economic matters between the federal and state levels of government. The
national government has the tendency to spend large amounts to bail out state
governments when lobbied to do so. If this national policy is relatively uniform across
states, individual state governments have less incentive to weigh the benefits versus the
costs of their policy decisions. For instance, although valuable labor and capital may be
driven outward by a state’s policies, political officials have little incentive to change
these policies.
Although individuals may maximize utility through migration in the short run, in
the long run migration will no longer be as effective. There are two reasons for this.
First, these policies may attract individuals from other states that favor income transfers
and social programs. These inmigrants will seek to perpetuate such policies through their
voting behaviors. Second, as these policies drain the given state from valuable factors of
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production, local political officials will seek the assistance of federal officials. In a
market-preserving federation, such efforts would be denied, prompting local officials to
weigh the benefits and costs of economic policy decisions. In contrast, if the federal
government answers the call for assistance, they will eventually need to raise revenues by
increasing the burden on states with more productive economic resources.

The

opportunity for individuals that prefer economic freedom to improve utility through
migration is lessened as economic authority becomes more centralized. In this case, it
becomes difficult for markets to continue and total welfare is lessened in the long run.
The allegation that internal migration within Canada is much smaller than within the
United States (Greenwood, 1997) could be due to the relative centralization of economic
authority in the former.
If interpreted in this manner, the findings are consistent with the literature on
market-preserving fiscal federalism. As long as economic authority is not sufficiently
decentralized, it becomes more difficult for political officials to carry out efficient
policies. Thus, markets which enhance overall utility in the long run are endangered.
Suggestions to solve this problem are to impose constitutional restrictions on the
involvement of the federal government in state economic matters (Holcombe 1994). In
this manner, politicians are induced to weigh the benefits and costs of their policies and
migration will be more likely to result in more efficient outcomes and higher total welfare
in the long run.
This argument by no means can be fully demonstrated by the results in this
chapter. There are many different interpretations for the results and further research is
needed to demonstrate the correct story behind these findings.
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3.5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The objective of this paper has been to analyze the impact of free market institutions on
migration flows between states. In particular, the effect of policies that restrict economic
freedom on migration flows is measured in U.S. states estimating a gravity model. The
theoretical model of interest is that of Tiebout (1956) which claims that individuals will
manifest their preferences through migration.

Using the Economic Freedom of

North America Index (Karabegovic and McMahon, 2005) and a general spatial
autoregressive estimator it is found that individuals are induced to migrate to states with
relatively higher government expenditures and social security, relatively smaller
impediments in the labor market, and smaller tax burdens.
Migration has often been suggested as a way of measuring the ability of
individuals to locate to areas that increase their utility.

It also holds important

implications in terms of analyzing the effect of institutions and federalism in making
public policy.

Weingast (1995) and Qian and Weingast (1997) argue that

decentralization of economic authority from the national to local governments causes
political officials to align their behavior to the preferences of constituents. The ability of
individuals to migrate from one state to another demonstrates that individuals can and do
manifest these preferences through migration. The implication suggested by Tiebout
(1956), Weingast (1995), and Qian and Weingast (1997) indicates that their may be
improvements in market efficiency and total utility by decentralizing economic authority.
Holcombe (1994) suggests instituting constitutional rules limiting power at the federal
level which would allow these gains to occur due to greater competition between regions.
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CHAPTER 4
INCOME INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM IN THE U.S. STATES

“Although under competition the probability that a man
who starts poor will reach great wealth is much smaller
than is true of the man who has inherited property, it is not
only possible for the former, but the competitive system is
the only one where it depends solely on him and not on the
favors of the mighty, and where nobody can prevent a man
from attempting to achieve this result…And who will deny
that a world in which the wealthy are powerful is still a
better world than one in which only the already powerful
can acquire wealth?”
—Friedrich Hayek, 1944
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CHAPTER 4
INCOME INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM IN THE U.S. STATES18

4.1 Introduction
Decades ago, economic research generally considered capitalism and socialism as
alternative and discrete forms of economic organization. In reality economies tend to lie
somewhere on a continuum between these two extremes. What differs on this continuum
is the degree to which governments tend to use command and control policies to
intervene into the private sector. Some socialist economies like North Korea are closer to
pure socialism, while others like China have considerably more market aspects. Others
which used to be more like North Korea have even moved to the other side of the
continuum, like the former Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia that have
adopted radical pro-market reforms. On the other hand, most market-based economies
have a much larger degree of government control and intervention than is envisioned
under pure laissez-faire capitalism.
Approximately a decade ago, a significant advance in our understanding of this
continuum was the publication of the Economic Freedom of the World index by James
Gwartney and Robert Lawson (first published in 1996, now updated annually). In this
publication, they derive a single index number for each country that places them on a
continuum from zero to ten, where ten represents the highest degree of reliance on
laissez-fare capitalism. In effect the index condenses the degree of ‘economic freedom’

18

This chapter is based on Ashby and Sobel (2006)
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individuals have in a geographic area in several key categories like low taxes, low
regulations, and secure property rights into a single number.
Studies using these indices such as Farr, Lord, and Wolfenbarger (1998),
Gwartney, Lawson, and Holcombe (1999), Cole (2003), and Powell (2003) have
consistently shown that countries with higher economic freedom scores not only have
larger per capita incomes, but also tend to have higher rates of economic growth. Other
studies have examined how this index correlates with everything from human selfperceived well being to health indicators, human migration, the productivity of
investment, the level of entrepreneurship, and the degree of income inequality (Esposto
and Zaleski, 1999, Norton, 2003; Melkumian, 2004; Ayal and Karras, 1998; Dawson,
1998; Ovaska and Sobel, 2005; Berggren, 1999; Grubel, 1998; Scully, 2002).
More recently, Amela Karabegovic and Fred McMahon (2005) released their
Economic Freedom of North America ranking U.S. states with respect to each other in
terms of their degree of free-market orientation.19 The differences among states occurs
because state and local policies also impact the degree of ‘economic freedom’ individuals
enjoy. The variance across states, however is obviously much less than the difference
among countries. The international index differs among countries in more categories,
such as monetary stability, tariff policy, and conscription. These categories simply are
not relevant when making comparisons among sub-regions within a single country. The
degree of economic freedom in each state is, however, impacted by the federal
government’s level of involvement in that state (e.g., in government employment
measures in each state).

19

The index also includes rankings for Canadian provinces.
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The empirical literature using the Economic Freedom of North America Index has
mirrored the previous literature using the international freedom index.

Explained

variations in the rates of economic growth, entrepreneurship, and migration, for example,
have for the most part carried over to cross-state analysis with equally significant results
(Karabegovic, Samida, Schlegel, and McMahon, 2003; Kreft and Sobel, 2005; Ashby,
2007).20 In this paper we conduct the first analysis of how differences in economic
freedom among U.S. states impacts income between the lowest, middle, and highest
income quintiles and inequality between the highest and lowest income quintiles.
There are two main reasons why a similar analysis using U.S. state-level data is
worthwhile. First, the two main studies on this subject using the international freedom
index, both of which appeared in Public Choice, have found strikingly opposite results,
and our analysis may help to clarify the mixed results. Berggren (1999), for example,
finds that higher levels of economic freedom are associated with higher income
inequality, while Scully (2002) finds that higher levels of economic freedom are
associated with lower income inequality (although changes in freedom are found to work
in the opposite direction).21 Second, while it seems obvious that the huge differences in
institutions across countries will impact income inequality, it isn’t so clear whether the
smaller variation in policies among U.S. states can have a measurable impact. Can
improvements in income inequality be used as a justification for smaller pro-market

20

With regard to migration, the outcomes are not fully comparable. Internationally, Melkumian (2004)
finds that higher economic freedom in the source country increases migration flows to the United States,
but does not analyze whether individuals move to locations with higher economic freedom. At the state
level, Ashby (2006) demonstrates that individuals migrate into states with relatively higher levels of
economic freedom.
21

Adding to the complexity, Berggren (1999) also includes a measure of the change in economic freedom,
and finds it to be associated with lower income inequality.
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policy reforms at the state level, or is this argument applicable only to national-level
institutional reforms?
In theory, economic freedom could improve inequality or lead to an increase in
inequality. The first issue to analyze is to determine whether or not economic freedom
benefits individuals at all levels of income. Do individuals at the lower end of the
distribution benefit as well, or are the benefits fully captured by the wealthiest members
of society? If the lower income earners do benefit from economic freedom, do they
benefit to the extent that their share of total income increases, decreases, or does it stay
the same? It is possible to think that individuals at the lower end might benefit more than
the wealthiest of individual from policies changes which facilitate entrepreneurial
activities and entry into different vocations. Instead of having to beg for their bread due
to lack of opportunities, many of these may be more likely to produce a surplus of loaves
if the costs of doing so are reduced and thus greatly increase their wellbeing. Of course,
for states with low levels of economic freedom to begin with, significant changes may
not be enough to benefit these individuals. Therefore, there is reason to think that the
initial level of economic freedom is important as well, if not more important.
We begin our paper with a brief review of the previous research examining
income inequality at the international level using the Economic Freedom of the World
Index (EFW). We then perform similar regressions using the Economic Freedom of
North America Index (EFNA), and discuss how the results compare. Additionally, we
perform an analysis of how economic freedom not only impacts relative measures of
income inequality, but also the absolute mean income levels within the lowest, middle,
and highest income quintiles. We end with concluding remarks.
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4.2 Literature Review
Despite the myriad of studies which analyze international economic freedom and its
relationship to income levels and economic growth, only a few studies exist which
analyze the impact on income inequality.22 Berggren (2003) provides a recent overview
of the benefits of economic freedom and discusses the cross-national studies of the
impact economic freedom on inequality. Numerous studies on inequality at the state
level exist (Partridge, 2006; Partridge, Partridge and Rickman, 1998; Partridge, Rickman,
and Levernier, 1996; Bishop, Formby, and Thistle, 1992; Stano, 1981). The relationship
between inequality and income growth is ambiguous in the literature (Partridge, 2006).
There has been much discussion on this issue and the proper measurements of inequality.
For the purpose of this study, we will focus on the measurement of inequality between
the share of income held by the highest income quintile to the share held by the lowest
quintile comparing our results to the findings of two papers published in Public Choice.
In the first study on this issue, Berggren (1999) finds that countries with a positive
change in economic freedom between 1975 and 1985 experienced a reduction in income
inequality as a result. Specifically, the share of income held by the lowest quintile rose
while the share held by the highest quintile fell. In addition, Berggren (1999) finds a
somewhat counterintuitive result—that while changes (increases) in economic freedom
were associated with less income inequality, the levels of economic freedom in 1985 (at
the end of the sample period) were associated with more income inequality. Berggren
(2003) offers an explanation for his result that changes in economic freedom lessen
22

Results are mixed for studies which analyze the impact of economic growth on inequality. Most
recently, Forbes (2000) and Scully (2002) find that higher economic growth of market income increases
inequality. Others find the relationship between the two to be negative (Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994; Person and Tebelli, 1994; Birdsall, Ross and Sabot, 1995; and Clarke, 1995).
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inequality, while higher levels of economic freedom increase inequality based on an
argument regarding the extent of redistributive government policies.
Scully (2002), however, finds that higher levels of economic freedom result in
less inequality, opposite of the finding of Berggren (for the level of freedom). Scully
finds that the share of income held by the lowest two quintiles is positively impacted
whereas the share held by the highest two quintiles is lowered. Scully argues that his
results differ due to the fact that Berggren fails to adjust for differences in the unit or
basis of the sample upon which the inequality is measured.23
Grubel (1998) turns the equation around, asking whether levels of income
inequality in a country can explain a country’s level of economic freedom and economic
growth. He concludes that higher inequality is associated with higher economic freedom.
And while Grubel reverses the causal direction, his results would seem to be more
consistent with Berggren’s results. However, Grubel’s study includes only countries with
income levels above $17,000, significantly reducing the sample to only 17 countries.
Thus, it is unclear to what extent Grubel’s results can be generalized to the rest of the
world.

4.3 Data and Methodology
We now turn to our analysis of how state-level economic freedom impacts state-level
income inequality within the United States. Our analysis is made possible by the release
of new income inequality study from Bernstein, McNichol, and Lyons (2006) of the

23

Scully (2002) explains that different countries calculate income distribution measures differently, and he
adjusts for this by including dummy variables to account for which technique the country uses to construct
its index, while Berggren (1999) does not.
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Economic Policy Institute. The study provides data on the absolute levels of income by
quintile for three time periods: 1980-82, 1990-92, and 2001-03 (each of the three
observations is an average over the three year window listed). Their data is derived from
the Bureau of the Census’ March Current Population Survey (CPS). In their definition,
family income includes not only wages and salaries, but also other sources of cash
income such as interest income and cash benefits, including veterans’ assistance, welfare
payments, and child support income. Other Census Bureau data on tax liabilities and
credits, realized capital gains and losses, and the market value of near-cash benefits are
then used to construct a measure of post-tax and transfer income on which their study is
based.24
As was discussed in the introduction, we use the Economic Freedom of North
America Index from Karabegovic and McMahon (2005). Because the income data is a
three year average, a similar computation is done with the freedom index.25 This index is
made up of three major components: size of government, takings and discrimination, and
labor market regulation. While we generally use the overall index in our analysis, we
will also explore the component area scores individually. We restrict our sample to the
48 continental U.S. states.
For control variables we adopt similar measures as the previous studies, and
include in our regressions the percentage of individuals with a high school education, the
percentage living in a metropolitan area, and median income. Finally, we include dummy

24

They exclude only the value of public health care benefits (e.g. Medicare and Medicaid) because of the
lack of a generally accepted method for imputing the values.
25

With the exception of the 1980-82 measure, for which we use 1981 to 1983 because 1981 is the first year
for which the economic freedom score is available.
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variables for geographic regions within the United States. Our analysis examines how
economic freedom impacts income and inequality, holding these other factors constant.
All variables, their sources, and descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix.
The specific measures of income and income inequality we use as dependent
variables are: the absolute mean income levels within the lowest, middle, and highest
quintiles; the cumulative 20 year percentage income growth for each of these quintiles;
the shares of income held by the lowest, middle, and highest quintiles; and the ratio of the
highest to lowest quintile’s income shares. Although there are many other measurements
of income inequality, we focus on what was used by Scully and Berggren for
comparison’s sake. The only exception is that we do not use the Gini coefficient. All
data is in constant 2002 dollars. A quick examination of the raw data suggests some
interesting correlations. The most visually interesting relationships visible in the raw
data are in the scatter plots of quintile income growth rates when compared with changes
in economic freedom scores. Figure 4.1 shows this for all three of the income groups we
consider here. There is a fairly strong positive relationship in all three plots, even before
controlling for other variables. On the other hand, the similar plots using the levels of
economic freedom don’t reveal obvious visible patterns. Thus, it appears that of the
results from previous literature, Berggren’s result (that changes in freedom are positive)
might be the most likely to be confirmed. We now turn to regression methodology to
uncover these relationships more precisely, after controlling for the other factors.
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Figure 4.1 The Change in Economic Freedom and Income Growth in the Lowest,
Middle, and Highest Income Quintiles (1980-2003).
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Panel (b): Middle Quintile
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Figure 4.1 (continued)
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Prior to running our regressions, various diagnostic tests were performed. First, the
presence of significant outliers was excluded using the Hadi method (1992). Based on
this test, all 48 continental states were included in the regressions.

Second, the

correlations between our variables were examined for potential problems with
multicollinearity. All were below 0.60 in absolute value, and most were substantially
lower than this level. In addition, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated for
the explanatory variables and all were well below the critical value of 10 (the highest is
approximately 6).26
26

While all regressions are run using robust errors, we also tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity.
We employed Breusch-Pagan test for all specifications. Only one of ten specifications demonstrated the
presence of heteroskedasticity at the 10 percent level of significance. Therefore, it appears that
heteroskedasticity was not a problem.
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4.4 Regression Results
Table 4.1 displays the results for our regressions which analyze the impact of economic
freedom on using the cumulative percentage change in the mean income for individuals
belonging to the lowest, middle, and highest income quintiles between 1980 and 2003;
For each dependent variable we run three specifications: one using just the level of
economic freedom; one using just the change in economic freedom; and one including
both variables.27
The change in economic freedom is positive and significant in all specifications in
which it is included. Positive changes in economic freedom significantly increase the
growth rate for the lowest income quintile. The level of economic freedom, however, is
insignificant.28 Overall, our results in Table 4.1 confirm Berggren’s result that changes
matter, but not his result that the levels are negative and significant unless we consider
the regressions where only levels are included. In such cases for the middle and highest
income groups, the results are negative and significant concurring with Berggren and
going against the findings of Scully.

27

Scully (2002) uses the log-odds ratio of economic freedom levels. We try this as well, but find results
qualitatively identical to those presented here using the actual values of the index. We use the actual values
because the coefficient interpretations are direct and more intuitive. In addition, like most studies using the
freedom index to explain growth over subsequent periods, we use the initial value. Berggren uses the
ending value, but because his model includes the change in freedom, and because the ending value is
simply the initial value plus the change (a linear combination), in the specifications where we include both
the change and the level, the results would be unchanged if we used the ending value.
28

Another indication that economic freedom changes have more explanatory power than economic
freedom levels can be seen by comparing the R-squares across the regressions. When changes are
regressed without levels, the R-squared value is 0.41, larger than the 0.26 value when levels are regressed
without changes.
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We now turn our attention to similar regressions for the level of income. Table
4.2 shows the regression results for all three income groups on absolute income level.
The change in economic freedom is positive and significant five of the six equations
including both of the equations for the lowest quintile. The level of economic freedom is
significant in none of the equations for any of the three income groups. The implication
of these results is that positive changes in economic freedom increased the level of
income for all three income groups.
Turning our attention to the impact of economic freedom on the share of income
as a proportion of total income for all three income groups is analyzed, Table 4.3 shows
our regression results. Similar to our analysis of using growth and levels as dependent
variables, we analyze the impact in nine regressions. Interestingly, the level of economic
freedom is statistically significant for the lowest income quintile and it is positive. This
implies that economic freedom changes as well as levels increase the share of income
held by the lowest quintile. Interestingly, both changes and levels are insignificant on the
shares of income held by the middle and highest income quintiles.
For all three income quintiles we examine, the change in economic freedom is
consistently associated with higher average incomes and higher income growth—for the
lowest, middle, and highest income quintiles. Examining our coefficient estimates across
all specifications suggests that policy reform increasing the economic freedom score by
one unit, which is roughly the same as comparing the 10th ranked state with the 43rd
ranked state, has a significant impact. These impacts are illustrated in Figure 4.2. quintile
by roughly $4,900 (relative to the mean of $115,045 represents a 4.3 percent increase).
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This same one unit change in economic freedom also increases the cumulative mean
income growth over the 23 year period by roughly 10 percent for the lowest quintile
(relative to the mean growth of 22 percent); also by roughly 10 percent for the middle
quintile (relative to the mean growth of 30 percent); and by roughly 13 percent for the
highest quintile (relative to the mean growth of 50 percent). Clearly, the impact of
changes in economic freedom is both statistically and economically significant.
The impact of economic freedom on the well being of individuals is best
measured by examining either the changes in levels or growth rates of income (as we
have already done), rather than by examining income shares. Measures of the shares of
income held by different groups do tell us something about relative economic positions,
but most individuals would prefer to live in a society where the poorest had an income
level of $3,000 and the richest have $10,000 over a society where everyone had $1,000.
And we have already demonstrated that changes in freedom have exactly this type of
across-the-board impact on economic well being in the U.S. states. However, it is
common to also examine income shares. We have already seen that economic freedom
lowest and middle quintiles.

If economic freedom changes reduce relative income

inequality, the lowest quintile should have a positive coefficient (which it did), while the
highest quintile should have a negative coefficient.

The coefficient for the middle

quintile would be ambiguous, and we find it to be significant in only one of the two
specifications, where it was small and positive. In Table 4.3 we see that the coefficient is
negative for the highest quintile, however, it is statically insignificant.
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Table 4.1 The Impact of Economic Freedom (Level and Changes) on the Cumulative Percentage Change in Income for the Lowest, Middle, and
Highest Income Quintile
Independent Variables
Constant
Change in Economic
Freedom 1981-83 to
2001-03

Economic
Freedom
Level 1981-83 (avg.)

Dependent Variable
Cumulative Percentage Change in Income
for the Lowest Quintile (1980 to 2003)
14.904
20.105
16.865
(0.67)
(0.94)
(0.64)
10.198***

9.431***

(3.69)

(4.60)

1.608

-

(0.48)
Percentage with High
School Degree in 1980
Percentage Living in
Metropolitan Area in
1980
Median Income in 1980
South
Northeast
West

R-squared

-

Cumulative Percentage Change in Income
for the Middle Quintile (1980 to 2003)
20.284
15.318
22.121
(0.81)
(0.66)
(0.840)
9.55***

10.283***

(3.47)

(4.52)

-2.369

-1.535

-

(0.77)

(0.49)

-

Cumulative Percentage Change in Income
for the Highest Quintile (1980 to 2003)
91.314**
74.507**
93.671***
(2.48)
(2.06)
(2.92)
12.258***

14.738***

-

(2.61)

(3.78)

-5.26

-5.196

-

(5.26)
1.076***

(1.54)
0.108

0.001

0.529

-9.976***
(3.11)

0.252

0.286

0.603

0.748**

0.717**

(0.70)

(0.83)

(1.47)

(2.25)

(2.14)

(2.68)

(0.18)

(0.00)

(0.92)

-0.141**

-0.138**

-0.043

-0.006

-0.009

0.0856

0.133

0.123

0.251***

(2.31)
-0.0004
(0.75)
-5.664
(1.16)
-4.538
(0.96)
-11.636**
(2.26)

(2.27)
-.0003
(0.73)
-5.171
(1.18)
-5.24
(1.18)
-12.011**
(2.47)

(0.61)
0.000
(0.67)
-2.324
(0.46)
-5.412
(1.08)
-15.318***
(2.80)

(-0.10)
-0.001**
(2.15)
1.171
(0.25)
4.104
(0.98)
-14.909***
(4.27)

(0.15)
-0.001**
(2.53)
0.7
(0.15)
4.774
(1.30
-14.551***
(4.26)

(1.17)
-0.001*
(1.80)
4.298
(0.83)
3.285
(0.74)
-18.357***
(4.51)

(1.38)
-0.0009
(1.56)
1.688
(0.26)
12.913**
(2.01)
-5.567
(0.78)

(1.29)
-0.001
(1.80)
0.096
(0.01)
15.183**
(2.51)
-4.356
(0.63)

(2.76)
-0.001
(1.37)
5.702
(0.78)
11.863*
(1.75)
-9.993
(1.38)

0.42

0.41

0.26

0.56

0.55

0.44

0.55

0.53

0.47

Notes: Absolute t-ratios in parenthesis. Statistical significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. All regressions employ robust standard errors.
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Table 4.2 The Impact of Economic Freedom (Level and Changes) on the Level of Income for the Lowest, Middle, and Highest
Income Quintile.

Independent Variables
Constant
Change in Economic
Freedom 1981-83 to
2001-03
Economic
Freedom
Level 1981-83 (avg.)

Dependent Variable
Absolute Income Level of Lowest Quintile
(2001-03)
-4415.91
-3459.126
-4037.45
(1.23)
(1.10)
(0.93)

Absolute Income Level of Middle Quintile
(2001-03)
-3937.7***
-6482.3
-3324.3
(0.44)
(0.75)
(0.35)

Absolute Income Level of Highest Quintile
(2001-03)
12899.86
8050.33
13774.79
(0.56)
(0.35)
(0.64)

1967.90***

1826.74***

3189.46***

3564.86***

-

4549.38

5264.82**

(5.31)

(7.28)

(3.27)
-786.64

(4.32)
-

(1.53)

(2.36)

-2030.5*

-1499.18

-

295.781

-

(0.68)
Percentage with High
School Degree in
1980
Percentage Living in
Metropolitan Area in
1980
Median Income in 1980
South
Northeast
West

R-squared

-

-471.664
(1.03)

(0.70)

(1.80)

(0.46)

-

-3273.36
(1.22)

134.825**

140.925***

202.408***

279.554**

263.33**

389.09**

387.536

356.615

543.775

(2.58)

(2.73)

(2.99)

(2.22)

(2.08)

(2.60)

(1.14)

(1.07)

(1.63)

-26.277***

-25.669***

-7.353

0.214

-1.402

30.886

257.673***

254.593***

301.422***

(2.73)
0.326***
(4.80)
-664.332
(0.98)
-77.8184
(0.11)
-2237.78***
(3.90)

(2.71)
0.338***
(5.63)
-573.69
(0.91)
-206.99
(0.31)
-2306.76***
(4.15)

(0.60)
0.329***
(4.04)
-19.888
(0.02)
-246.53
(0.31)
-2948.29***
(4.24)

(0.01)
0.956
(5.25)
757.992
(0.43)
1553.24
(0.96)
-5490.8***
(4.17)

(0.06)
0.922***
(5.53)
516.919
(0.28)
1896.79
(1.36)
-5307.3***
(4.13)

(1.17)
0.961***
(4.54)
1802.47
(0.96)
1279.81
(0.76)
-6642.3***
(4.45)

(4.24)
1.70928***
(3.28)
8129.79*
(1.79)
9255.52**
(2.12)
-4502.59
(1.05)

(4.31)
1.64608***
(3.40)
7670.36*
(1.68)
9910.26***
(2.73)
-4152.173
(1.02)

(4.72)
1.717***
(3.31)
9619.62**
(2.23)
8865.5**
(2.04)
-6145.2
(1.42)

0.82

0.82

0.73

0.84

0.84

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.79

Notes: Absolute t-ratios in parenthesis. Statistical significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. All regressions employ robust standard errors.
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Table 4.3 The Impact of Economic Freedom (Level and Changes) on the Share of Income Held by the Lowest, Middle, and Highest
Income Quintile.

Independent Variables
Constant
Change in Economic
Freedom 1981-83 to
2001-03

Economic
Freedom
Level 1981-83 (avg.)

Dependent Variable
Lowest Quintile Share of Total Income
(2001-03)
0.046***
0.05***
0.047***
(5.01)
(6.10)
(4.35)
0.003***

0.003***

(3.29)

(3.08)

0.002*

-

(1.69)
Percentage with High
School Degree in 1980
Percentage Living in
Metropolitan Area in
1980
Median Income in 1980
South
Northeast
West

R-squared

-

Middle Quintile Share of Total Income
(1980 to 2003)
0.154***
0.15***
0.152***
(11.89)
(12.84)
(11.32)
-

Highest Quintile Share of Total Income
(2001-03)
0.464***
0.464***
0.462***
(12.04)
(13.44)
(11.28)
-0.006

-0.006

(1.27)

(1.42)

-0.0019

2x10-6

-

-1.55
0.0003

(0.00)

0.0002

-0.0005

-0.0005

-0.0007

0.002

0.003*

(1.43)

(1.81)

0.0002

-0.001

-

(0.18)

(0.94)
0.0002

-

0.002
(0.66)

0.0002

0.0002

0.0003*

(1.22)

(1.46)

(1.89)

(1.07)

(0.99)

(1.39)

(0.73)

(0.74)

(1.02)

-0.0002***

-0.0002***

-0.0001***

-0.0002***

-0.0002***

-0.0001***

0.0006***

0.0006***

0.0005***

(5.96)
2x10-7
(0.88)
-0.005***
(3.18)
-0.0037**
(2.55)
-0.003
(1.65)

(5.76)
2x10-7
(1.17)
-0.005***
(2.78)
-0.0043***
(3.11)
-0.0034*
(1.92)

(5.07)
2x10-7
(0.92)
-0.004**
(2.12)
-0.004**
(2.55)
-0.004**
(2.34)

(4.12)
5x10-7*
(1.89)
-0.005**
(2.11)
-0.004**
(2.45)
-0.007***
(3.1)

(4.23)
5x10-7*
(1.82)
-0.005**
(2.23)
-0.003**
(2.10)
-0.007***
(3.01)

(4.11)
5x10-7*
(1.78)
-0.004
(1.67)
-0.004**
(2.56)
-0.008***
(3.64)

(5.35)
-2x10-6*
(1.99)
0.013**
(2.22)
0.012**
(2.66)
0.015**
(2.30)

(5.44)
-2x10-6**
(2.04)
0.013**
(2.14)
0.012***
(2.78)
0.015**
(2.37)

(5.19)
-2x10-6
(1.89)
0.011*
(1.73)
0.012***
(2.81)
0.017***
(2.84)

0.70

0.69

0.64

0.62

0.62

0.60

0.63

0.63

0.61

Notes: Absolute t-ratios in parenthesis. Statistical significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. All regressions employ robust standard errors.
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We examine this share issue more directly in Table 4.4 where we present the
results of regression analysis for the impact of economic freedom changes and levels on
the ratio of the highest quintile’s income share to the lowest quintile’s income share. In

Figure 4.2: The Impact of a One Unit Increase in Economic Freedom on Income Levels
and Growth for the Lowest, Middle, and Highest Income Quintiles.
Panel (a): Mean Absolute Income Levels

Change in Mean Income Level
$6,000

(+ 4.3%)

$5,000
$4,000

(+ 7%)

$3,000
$2,000

(+ 11%)

$1,000
$0
Low est Quintile

Middle Quintile

Highest Quintile

Panel (b): Cumulative Income Growth 1980-2003 (%)
Percentage Point Change in Cumulative
Income Growth (1980-03)
20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
Low est Quintile

Middle Quintile

Highest Quintile
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Table 4.4 Economic Freedom and Income Inequality: The Ratio of the Share of Income
Held by the Highest Quintile to the Share of Income Held by the Lowest Income Quintile

Independent Variables
Constant
Change in Economic Freedom 1981-83 to 2001-03
Economic Freedom Level 1981-83 (avg.)
Percentage with High School Degree in 1980

Percentage Living in Metropolitan Area in 1980
Median Income in 1980
South
Northeast

West

R-squared

Dependent Variable: Share of Income held
by the Highest Quintile divided by the Share
of Income held by the Lowest Quintile (200103)
8.752**
*
8.841***
8.451***
(5.91)
(6.35)
(5.04)
-0.461**
-0.403***
(2.61)
(2.75)
-0.121
0.059
(0.92)
(0.46)
-0.025
-0.027003
-0.04
(1.04)
(1.15)
(1.55)
0.021**
0.025***
0.025***
*
(6.11)
(6.15)
(5.39)
-0.00004
-0.00005
-0.00004
(1.44)
(1.58)
(1.38)
0.75***
0.713***
0.6**
(3.23)
(2.89)
(2.11)
0.56***
0.613***
0.6***
(2.86)
(3.19)
(2.87)
0.721**
0.554**
0.582**
*
(2.05)
(2.25)
(2.78)

0.6978

0.6937

0.6493

Notes: Absolute t-ratios in parenthesis. Statistical significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
All regressions employ robust standard errors.

both regressions in which it is included, the coefficient on the change in economic
freedom is negative and significant, implying that economic freedom changes between
1980 and 2003 have reduced income inequality. Again, the level of economic freedom
seems to explain little, as it is insignificant in both regressions in which it is included. A
summary of our findings so far would be that increases in economic freedom are
associated with significantly higher levels of income, and higher income growth, for all,
while also reducing relative inequality. And these impacts can be felt by a state through

93
policy reform, regardless of their starting position (as can be witnessed by the relative
insignificance of the level of freedom in our statistical analysis). This, of course, begs the
question of which specific areas of policy reform matter most. To answer this question,
we now turn to an analysis using all the individual component area scores simultaneously
in the regressions.

4.5 Freedom Components
The Economic Freedom of North America Index is based on ten component area scores.
Regression analyses, however, generally do not include all of them simultaneously in a
regression because of problems with multicollinearity. Nations (or states) with freemarket policies in some areas generally also have them in others. After careful
correlation analysis, we exclude two of the component areas because they appear to be
redundant and have high correlation with the remaining components. In addition, due to
the limited degrees of freedom and the fact that the level of economic freedom seems to
be less important empirically, we only include the changes in our regressions. We run
these regressions on all of the dependent variables that were analyzed in the previous
section.
Table 4.5 summarizes the results for these regressions. To conserve space, like
Berggren (1999) we simply show which component areas had a significant coefficient
estimate in each specification, and in these cases indicate whether the coefficient was
positive or negative. The component areas are listed at the bottom of the table. Four of
the eight component score changes are insignificant in all of the regressions. The other
four are significant in at least one of the nine regressions. The component with the
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highest frequency of significance (5 of the 9 regressions) was EFCI, minimum wage laws
(in their index this reflects either the federal minimum wage or an applicable higher statelevel minimum wage, normalized by per capita GSP). Lower state minimum wages are
associated with significantly improved growth rates and levels of income for the highest
and middle income quintiles and a higher level of income for the lowest quintile. While
few would argue for the elimination of minimum wages to reduce their negative impact
on the levels and growth of income in the middle and highest quintiles, we find evidence
that minimum wages also hurt the average level of income in the lowest quintile (and
remember this measure includes transfer benefits). This is consistent with the findings in
the extensive analysis of how minimum wages impact the nominal earnings of minimum
wage workers by Sobel (1999). He also finds that higher minimum wages above their
current levels lead to reductions in the total earnings of all minimum wage workers
(incorporating both reduced employment and higher wages among those who retain their
jobs).
The component with the next highest frequency of statistical significance was
EFBI, an index based on small total tax revenues as a percentage of GSP. It is significant
in four of the nine regressions. States with smaller tax burdens actually have slower
income growth in the highest quintile and less income inequality (there is a positive
impact on both the low income share, and share relative to high income, and a negative
impact on the share of income held by the highest quintile and the ratio of income of the
highest to the lowest quintile. A state whose government reduced its spending would
experience a higher growth rate and the level of income for its middle income group and
a reduction in the income held by the highest income group.
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EFAI, an index based on small government consumption expenditures as a
percentage of GSP, was significant in three of the nine regressions. EFCII, an index
based on small government employment, is significant in one of the nine regressions. A
state which reduced government employment relative to total employment would
experience a reduction in the rate of income growth of its wealthiest individuals.
While we would caution the reader about the results in this section based on our
simultaneous inclusion of so many different measures of policy, that are all correlated,
taken at face value they suggest that elimination or reduction of minimum wages, and
smaller tax burdens, are the two most likely policy reforms that would promote income
equality and income growth for the lowest quintile.

4.6 Conclusion
While previous literature has examined the impact of economic freedom on income
inequality at the international level, we are the first to examine this relationship at the
U.S. state level. This was an interesting exercise for two reasons. First, the two main
studies at the international level find conflicting results, and ours may help to clarify the
debate. Second, while it seems obvious that the huge differences in institutions across
countries will impact income inequality, it isn’t so clear whether the smaller variation in
policies among U.S. states can have a measurable impact. Can improvements in income
inequality be used as a justification for smaller pro-market policy reforms at the state
level, or is this argument applicable only to national-level institutional reforms?
Our finding that changes in economic freedom are associated with higher income
levels and growth (across the board), and with reductions in relative income inequality
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Table 4.5 Economic Freedom Component Areas (summarized coefficient results) impact
on the high income share).
Dependent Variable:

EFAI

EFBI

EFCI

EFCII

Lowest Quintile
Cumulative Percentage
Growth (1980 to 2003)

Absolute Mean Income in
Quintile (2001-03 avg.)

Share of Income Held by
Quintile (2001-03)

Middle Quintile

(+)***

(+)*

Highest Quintile

(+)***

Lowest Quintile

(+)**

Middle Quintile

(+)**

(+)*

Highest Quintile

(-)**

Lowest Quintile

(+)*

Highest Quintile
Highest Quintile Share / Lowest Quintile Share (2001-03)
Significance Share (% of regressions)

(-)**

(-)**

(+)**

(-)**
(-)***

33.3%

44.4%

55.6%

11.1%

Notes: Shown are the sign (in parenthesis) of each component when statistically significant and ***, **,
and * demonstrate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. Significance share denotes the
share of regressions in which each component showed up significant. Components EFAII, EFAIII, EFBII,
and EFCIII are excluded because they failed to yield any significant results.
Component Areas of Economic Freedom of North America Index:
Area 1: Size of Government
EFAI: Govt. consumption expenditures as a percentage of GSP
EFAII: Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GSP
EFAIII: Employment insurance, workers compensation, and other pensions as a percentage of GSP
Area 2: Takings and Discriminatory Taxation
EFBI: Total Tax Burden as a Percentage of GSP: Includes income taxes, consumption taxes, property and
sales taxes, contributions to Social Security plans, and other taxes
EFBII: Top marginal income tax rate and the income threshold at which it applies
Area 3: Labor Market Freedom
EFCI: Minimum wage legislation: Annual income earned by an minimum-wage worker divided by percapita GSP
EFCII: Government employment as a percentage of total employment
EFCIII: Union density
Source: Karabegovic and McMahon (2005)
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are identical to the results of Berggren. We do not find support, however, for his result
that the level of economic freedom is, contrarily, negatively related to income inequality.
In our results this variable is generally insignificant, or when it appears it is often positive
as was Scully’s finding.
We also attempted to uncover which specific policy areas were most important in
promoting income growth and equality.

While our analysis has some unavoidable

drawbacks with multicollinearity, the findings suggest that reductions in both state
minimum wages and tax burdens would be the most helpful in promoting higher levels,
growth rates, and shares of income for the lowest quintile.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

“…enhancement of human freedom is both the main object
and the primary means of development.”
—Amartya Sen, 1999
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

5.1 SUMMARY
This thesis has been an analysis of the effect of economic freedom on the quality of life.
It has consisted of three distinct yet related studies. These analyses were discussed in
great detail in chapters 2 through 4.
Chapter 2 analyzed a panel data of 78 countries and the effect of economic
freedom on the Index of Human Progress (Emes and Hahn, 2001).

The IHP, a

measurement constructed by the Fraser Institute similar to the Human Development
Index (UN, 1999, 2000, 2001) takes into account measurements of quality of life beyond
income, life expectancy, and health indicators; it also better measures improvements
through time. In particular, attainment of technological goods such as televisions, radios,
and telephone services by country are included. Using 1975 as a base year, it is a better
measurement of progress through time.
The Economic Freedom of the World Index (Gwartney and Lawson, 2005)
constructed by the Fraser Institute was regressed on the IHP along with other institutional
measurements for the quality of government and the rule of law from the International
Country Risk Guide. The panel data included measurements from the years 1985, 1990,
1995, and 2000. After controlling for possible geographic impediments suggested by
Sachs and Warner (1997), it is found that economic freedom significantly impacts quality
of life using this measurement.

Additional regressions analyze the impact of the

economic freedom components on the quality of life. These regressions demonstrated
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that sound property rights and limited regulation are significant determinants of quality of
life.
The impact of economic freedom at the U.S. state level was analyzed as well in
chapters 3 and 4 using the Economic Freedom of North American Index (Karabegovic
and McMahon, 2005) also constructed by the Fraser Institute. Chapter 3 discussed an
analysis of the impact of economic freedom on migration flows between the lower 48
states and is based heavily on Ashby (2007). Although the evidence of the benefit of
economic freedom in income levels and growth is significant, there have been no
published studies analyzing the impact of economic freedom on the decision to migrate.
Using a gravity model which accounts for spatial effects it is found that economic
freedom significantly impacts migration flows. In addition, this study analyzes the raw
data for eight of the ten components to see how individuals react in aggregate to these
policies. Interestingly, all economic freedoms do not have the same impact. Measures
such as higher government consumption and social security payments—which would
tend to reduce economic freedom according to the index used in this study—are
significant in attracting migrants. However, states with lower marginal tax rates for the
highest income group and high income thresholds for these taxpayers, less restrictive
minimum wage laws, a smaller percentage of employees in the public sector as a
percentage of total employment, and a lower degree of unionization are all significant in
attracting migrants as well. These results were discussed in some detail as well as the
corresponding policy implications.
Chapter 4 analyzed how economic freedom levels in 1980 and economic freedom
changes have impacted individuals belonging different income groups by U.S. state. A
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handful of studies have done this at the international level, but this is the first to do so at
the U.S. state level. Regressions were run to analyze the impact of economic freedom
changes and levels between 1980-1982 to 2001-03 on measurements of income for
different groups. It was determined that positive economic freedom changes positively
impact income growth for the lowest and middle income quintiles during this period. It
was found that economic freedom changes significantly impact income levels for the
lowest and middle income quintiles as well as the highest quintile. Using the ratio of the
share of income held by the highest quintile to the share of income held by the lowest
quintile it was found that higher economic freedom actually reduces inequality.

5.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The contributions made in this dissertation are plenteous. First, it has been demonstrated
that economic freedom is a significant determinant of migration flows between U.S.
states. This finding alone has immense policy implications and should be considered by
those who are in the position to benefit from such policies or even stand to lose for failure
to recognize its importance. Another important contribution is that economic freedom
has a significant impact in improving the wellbeing of individuals in the lowest quintile
in the United States stand to benefit greatly from reforms that improve economic
freedom. The idea that economic freedom or free-market institutions tend to benefit the
wealthy at the expense of the poor has been challenged. Indeed, given that the ratio of
income held by the wealthiest to the income held by lowest income quintile actually
decreases as economic freedom increases demonstrates that the lowest income earners
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stand to benefit the most. Hopefully, this will be considered by policymakers in the
future.
Despite these contributions, there remains a great deal of research to be conducted
on these issues. For one, the issue of causality should be investigated. Does economic
freedom cause migration or does migration cause economic freedom?

Both are

interesting questions to consider. Has total migration changed through time as economic
freedom has changed? Canadian provinces have significantly lower economic freedom
and hence the gains for migration might be smaller one could argue. Is the propensity to
migrate any lower in Canada than it is in the United States? While controlling for other
important factors, this would be an important question to investigate empirically.
No well-versed economist is likely to debate the benefit of sound property rights.
The theory and empirics on this issue have demonstrated that it is very important if not
essential for development to occur. However, a lot more research must be conducted on
how such institutions result.

Many efforts to impose such institutions have been

attempted to no avail possibly due to the fact that the countries lack complementary
institutions to support these. The importance of informal institutions in developing
quality formal institutions has been discussed by North (1991). How do these informal
institutions result? Field work and historical analyses would go a long way towards
enlightening us on this issue. Indeed, most countries that enjoy a high quality of life
today are indebted to hundreds of years of institutional evolution.
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Table A.1 Description of Variables and Sources
Variable
Economic Freedom Components

Source
Gwartney and Lawson (2005)

Ethnic

Atlas Noradova Mira (1980), Easterly Levine dataset
(www. Worldbank.org/research/growth)

Qualityofgovernment

Political Risk Services (2004)

Human Development Index

U.N. Human Development Report (1995, 2001)

Index of Human Progress

Emes and Hahn (2001)[Fraser Institute]

Internet hosts per 1000

U.N. Human Development Report (2001)

Ruleoflaw

Political Risk Services (2004)

Tropics

Sachs and Warner (1997)

Urban

World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002)
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Table A.2 Correlation Matrix for the Institutional Variables

Qualityofgovernment RuleofLaw Economicfreedom Governmentsize Property Money Trade Regulation
1.000
Qualityofgovernment
0.813
1.000
RuleofLaw
0.576
0.637
1.000
Economicfreedom
-0.158
-0.086
0.400
1.000
Governmentsize
0.798
0.857
0.749
-0.089
1.000
Property
0.444
0.481
0.850
0.184
0.565
1.000
Money
0.531
0.571
0.849
0.209
0.658
0.622 1.000
Trade
0.458
0.472
0.845
0.386
0.573
0.615 0.698
Regulation
1
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Table A.3 List of Countries in Sample

Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Finland

France
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia

Mali
Malta
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands, The
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Senegal
Singapore
South Korea

Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Figure A.1 Explanation on the Calculation of the Human Development Index (HDI) and
the Index of Human Progress (IHP)
1. Human Development Index (UND 1997):
(1)

HDI=(Life Expectancy Score+Education Score+GDP Score)/3

Each indicator is determined using the following equation:
(2)

Indicator Score=(Xcountry – Xmin)/(Xmax -Xmin)

The UN assumes a minimum value and a maximum value for each indicator.
The sub indices are calculated as follows:
A. (Life Expectancy Score)country=Life Expectancycountry
B. Education Score=[2(Literacy Score)-1(Combined gross enrolment ratio)]/3
a. Literacy Score: percentage of people 15 and older that can read and write
b. Combined gross enrolment ratio:(Combined gross enrolment ratio)]/3
C. GDP Score:
a. Log of GDP per capita (PPP USD):
(log GDPcountry-log GDPmin)/(log GDPmax-log GDPmin)

2. Index of Human Progress (Emes and Hahn, 2001):
(3)

IHP=(Health Score+Education Score+Technology Score+GDP Score)/4

Each indicator is measured using (2), however minimum and maximum values are not assumed. The
minimum and maximum values of all countries in 1975 are used for each indicator.
The sub indices are calculated as follows:
A. Health Score
a. Life Expectancy
b. Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)∗ Mortality of children under five years of age (per
1000 births)*
c. Adult mortality rate (number of adults per 1000 adults not expected to survive to age 60)*
B. Education Score
a. Literacy rate
b. Combined enrolment ratio
C. Technology Score
a. Number of televisions (per 1000 persons)*
b. Number of radios (per 1000 persons)*
c. Telephone services (per 1000 persons)*
d. GDP Score: GDP per capita (PPP USD)
∗

Variable is not included in HDI
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Figure A.2 Algebraic Explanation for the Calculation of the Chain-linked Economic
Freedom Component Scores

EFWit
= EFWt
5
i =1
5

∑

(1)

5

EFWCH it

i =1

5

∑

(2)

= EFWCH t

(1) and (2),
5

⇒

∑ EFWit

(3) i =1

EFWt

5

∑ EFWCH it

= i =1

EFWCH t

(3),
5

⇒

5

∑ EFWi

i =1

EFWt

(4) ∑ EFWCH it = EFWCH t i = 1

(4),

⇒

EFWit =
EFWt =
EFWCHit =
EFWCHt =

(5)

EFWCH it =

EFWCH t × EFWit
EFWt

Known economic freedom component score i in year t for a given country
Known economic freedom weighted-average score for a given year t
Unknown chain-linked economic freedom component score i in year t for
a given country
Known chain-linked economic freedom weighted-average score in year t
for a given country
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Figure A.3 The Areas and Components of the EFW Index

1. Governmentsize: Expenditures, Taxes and Enterprises
A. General government consumption spending as a percentage of total
consumption
B. Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
C. Government Enterprises and investment as a percentage of total investment
D. Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies)
i. Top marginal income tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies
ii. Top marginal income and payroll tax rates (and income threshold at
which they apply
2. Property
A. Judicial independence—the judiciary is independent and not subject to
interference by the government or parties in dispute
B. Impartial courts—a trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to
challenge the legality of government actions or regulation
C. Protection of intellectual property
D. Military interference in rule of law and the political process
E. Integrity of the legal system
3. Money
A. Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus
average annual growth of real GDP in the last ten years
B. Standard inflation variability in the last five years
C. Recent inflation rate
D. Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad
4. Trade
A. Taxes on international trade
i. Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports
plus imports
ii. Mean tariff rate
iii.
Standard deviation of tariff rates
B. Regulatory trade barriers
i. Hidden import barriers—no barriers other than published tariffs and
quotas
ii. Costs of importing—the combines effect of import tariffs, license fees,
bank fees, and the time required for administrative red-tape raises the
costs of importing equipment (by 10% or less=score of 10; by more
than 50%=score of 0)
C. Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size
D. Difference between official exchange rate and black-market rate
E. International capital market controls
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i.

Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to
domestic capital markets
ii. Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market
exchange with foreigners—index of capital controls among 13 IMF
categories
5. Regulation
A. Credit market regulations
i.
Ownership of banks—percentage of deposits held in privately owned
banks
ii.
Competition—domestic banks face competition from foreign banks
iii. Extension of credit—percentage of credit extended to private sector
iv. Avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to
negative real interest rates
v.
Interest rate controls—interest rate controls on bank deposits and/or
loans are freely determined by the market
B. Labor market regulations
i.
Impact of minimum wage—the minimum wage, set by law, has
little impact on wages because it is too low or not obeyed
ii.
Hiring and firing practices—hiring and firing practices of
companies are determined by private contract
iii.
Share of labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective
bargaining
iv.
Unemployment benefits—the unemployment benefits system
preserves the incentive to work
vi. Use of conscripts to obtain military personnel
C. Business regulations
i.
Price controls—extent to which businesses
ii.
Administrative conditions and new businesses—administrative
procedures are an important obstacle to starting a new business
iii.
Time with government bureaucracy—senior management spends a
substantial amount of time dealing with government bureaucracy
iv.
Starting a new business—starting a new business is generally easy
v.
Irregular payments—irregular, additional payments connected with
import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax
assessments, police protection, or loan applications are very rare

Source: Gwartney and Lawson, 2005
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Table B.1 Data Sources and Description
Variable Name

Source

Description

Economicfreedom

Economic Freedom of North America (2005)

Governmentcons

Economic Freedom of North America (2005)

Transfers

Economic Freedom of North America (2005)

Socialsecurity

Economic Freedom of North America (2005)

Taxrevenues

Economic Freedom of North America (2005)

Marginaltax

Economic Freedom of North America (2005)

Minwage

Economic Freedom of North America (2005)

Governmentemploy

Economic Freedom of North America (2005)

Uniondensity

Economic Freedom of North America (2005)

Migration Flows

U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000)

Population

U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000)

Average of index from 1990 to
1995 (See Table 1)
General
government
expenditures by government as a
percentage of GSP averaged
between 1990 and 1995
Transfers and subsidies as a
percentage of GSP averaged
between 1990 and 1995
Payments
by
Employment
Insurance,
Workers
Compensation,
and
other
pensions as a percentage of GSP
averaged between 1990 and 1995
The sum of income taxes,
consumption taxes, property and
sales taxes, contributions to
social security plans, and other
taxes as a percentage of GSP
averaged between 1990 and 1995
Ten divided by the score for
highest marginal tax rate and the
threshold at which it kicks in
averaged between 1990 and 1995
The minimum wage multiplied
by the hours worked by a fulltime employee divided by percapita GSP averaged between
1990 and 1995
The
amount
of
workers
employed as public servants or
by
government
enterprises
divided by the total employment
(military is excluded) averaged
by state between 1990 and 1995
The size of the manufactured
sector and the size of the
government sector are regressed
on union density; since the
former was insignificant and the
latter was significant, this
variable was measured holding
government
employment
constant. This is averaged
between 1990 and 1995
State-to-state flows from each
origin state to each possible
destination state in the lower 48
U.S. states
Population in 1995 calculated by
taking population over five in
2000 minus the amount of
individuals that moved into a
given state plus those that moved
out of a given state between 1995
and 2000
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Table B.1 (continued)
Income

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2005)

Geographical Cost of Living
Index (GCLI)

Center for the Study of Educational Finance
(1991)

Gross State Deflator (GSD)

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2005)

Employmentgrowth

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2005)

Retired

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990)

Heatingdays

National Climatic Data Center (2000) HCS 51

Precipitation

National Climatic Data Center (2000) HCS 4-2

Distance and
Distancesquared

U.S. Department of Defense (2005)

Income per capita converted into
real income using cost of living
measurements (see Gross State
Deflator and Geographical Cost
of Living Index) and averaged
between 1990 and 1995
Used the 1990 cost of living
levels by state (the last year for
which this index was calculated)
and then estimated the cost of
living in each state from 1991 to
1995 using the Gross State
Deflator
Used to calculate the changes in
the cost of living in each state
between 1990 and 1995
The percentage change in
employment by state between
1990 and 1995
The percentage of the population
age 65 and over by state in 1990
A heating day is the difference
between 65 and any number
below summed over an entire
year
Average amount of precipitation
in inches from 1971-2000 by
state
Distances between the principle
cities for each origin and
destination state
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Table C.1 Variable Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Variable:

Cumulative Percentage Growth (1980
to 2003) in the Lowest Quintile’s
Average Absolute Income (× 100)a
Cumulative Percentage Growth (1980
to 2003) in the Middle Quintile’s
Average Absolute Income (× 100)a
Cumulative Percentage Growth (1980
to 2003) in the Highest Quintile’s
Average Absolute Income (× 100)a
Lowest Quintile’s Average Absolute
Income (2001-03)a
Middle Quintile’s Average Absolute
Income (2001-03)a
Highest Quintile’s Average Absolute
Income (2001-03)a
Share of Income held by the Lowest
Quintile (2001-03)a
Share of Income held by the Middle
Quintile (2001-03)a
Share of Income held by the Highest
Quintile (2001-03)a
Ratio of Quintile’s Income Share to
Lowest Quintile’s Income Share
(2001-03)a
Change in State’s Economic Freedom
Score (avg. 1981-83 to avg. 200103)b
State’s Economic Freedom Score
(avg. 1981-83)b
Percentage with High School Degree
in 1980c
Percentage Living in Metropolitan
Area in 1980c
Median Income in 1980c
South Regional Dummy
West Regional Dummy
North Regional Dummy

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

22.14

9.62

5.70

51.5

30.26

10.63

8.50

52.60

56.98

16.07403

24.10

88.50

17,421.69

2,476.51

13,208

23,128

46,733.65

6,407.36

36,090

60,400

115,045.50

16,068.20

87,230

154,614

0.063

0.005

0.054

0.074

0.17

0.006

0.156

0.182

0.418

0.017

0.382

0.453

6.65

0.79

5.16

8.11

0.890

0.500

-0.433

1.733

5.774

0.523

4.567

7.167

67.03

7.34

53.10

80.00

61.375

23.035

15.300

94.900

35,884.21
0.3125
0.229
0.229

3,930.23
0.47
0.425
0.425

28,125
0
0
0

44,883
1
1
1

Sources: a Bernstein, Jared, Elizabeth McNichol, and Karen Lyons. 2006; b Karabegovic,
McMahon, 2005; c U.S. Census Bureau, 1980.
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